Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2019

Between Reparations and Repair: Assessing the Work of the ICC
Trust Fund for Victims Under Its Assistance Mandate
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin
University of Minnesota Law School, niaol002@umn.edu

Anne Dutton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Anne Dutton, Between Reparations and Repair: Assessing the Work of the ICC
Trust Fund for Victims Under Its Assistance Mandate, 19 CHI. J. INT'L L. 490 (2019), available at
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/856.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Between Reparations and Repair: Assessing the Work of
the ICC Trust Fund for Victims Under Its Assistance
Mandate
Anne Dutton & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin 

Abstract
The practice of international justice has made a significant shift from narrowly focused
criminal accountability to a broader and more holistic understanding encompassing the totality
of victims’ justice needs. In particular, international criminal justice is concerned with victims of
mass atrocity crimes, whose needs are profound and whose capacities are limited by the
experiences of gross and systematic violence. These needs include individual and communal
capacity building to engage in criminal processes as well as remedy and repair in the aftermath
of criminal procedures. The Trust Fund for Victims represents, in many ways, the epicenter of
this shift in international law practice, as a unique institution that has a central role in
providing both an assistance and reparations mandate under the International Criminal Court
(Rome) Statute. A clear innovation of the Trust Fund’s work is its capacity to be
operationalized before a criminal finding is made, providing the means to support victim
survivors in situations still under investigation by the Prosecutor. In this capacity, the Trust
Fund is priming and creating the conditions conducive to effective participation by victims in the
Court’s work. This article addresses how well that task has been operationalized in practice by
the Trust Fund. In parallel, the assessment has a wider purview by allowing a broad
engagement with the challenges, complexities, and realities on the ground that shape the
enforcement of reparations for victims, as well as molding institutional responses by intervenors
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including the Trust Fund. Given the challenges of successfully implementing reparations there is
often little time or capacity to measure (as one goes along) what has worked effectively and what
has not. International organizations, states, courts, and civil society have made consistent calls
for evidence of success, failure, and/or the value of reparations. At the simplest level, because
most human rights and humanitarian law treaties provide for the right to a remedy, assessing if
remedies work in practice is critical to understanding if state obligation has, in fact,
delivered. This Article provides concrete, contextual, and novel assessment of the delivery of
reparations for systematic human rights violations, offering timely and relevant analysis for the
International Criminal Court in particular and scholars/practitioners concerned with the
conceptualization and delivery of reparations in practice. The analysis and data presented is
based on unique access to the Trust Fund's operations combined with on the ground assessment
of the programming for assistance and reparations in Northern Uganda. The data
underpinning the research findings is singular and makes a new contribution to the literature
and practice of international criminal justice.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The practice of international justice has made a significant shift from
narrowly focused criminal accountability to a broader and more holistic
understanding of the totality of victims’ justice needs. In particular, international
criminal justice is concerned with victims of mass atrocity crimes, whose needs
are profound and whose capacities are limited by the experiences of gross and
systematic violence. These needs include individual and communal capacity
building to engage in criminal processes, as well as remedy and repair in the
aftermath of criminal procedures. The Trust Fund for Victims represents, in
many ways, the epicenter of this shift in international law practice, as a unique
institution that has a central role in providing both an assistance and reparations
mandate under the International Criminal Court (Rome) Statute.1 This research
was undertaken to address how well that task has been operationalized in
practice by the Trust Fund. In parallel, the assessment has a wider purview by
allowing a broad engagement with the challenges, complexities and realities on
the ground that shape the enforcement of reparations for victims, as well as
molding institutional responses by intervenors including the Trust Fund. Given
the challenges of successfully implementing reparations there is often little time
or capacity to measure (as one goes along) what has worked effectively and what
has not. International organizations, states, courts, and civil society have made
consistent calls for evidence of success, failure, and/or the value of reparations.2
Moreover, the value of evaluation in the practice of transitional justice,
international criminal law, and human rights is increasingly recognized.3 At the
simplest level, because most human rights and humanitarian law treaties provide
for the right to a remedy, assessing if remedies work in practice is critical to
understanding if state obligation has, in fact, delivered.4 State obligations with

1

2

3

4

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute, art. 68(3)
proclaims the principle of victim participation “[w]here the personal interests of the victim are
affected.”
See, for example, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-3217, Order Pursuant to Rule 103 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 5, 7 (July 15, 2016).
See, for example, Louise Mallinder & Catherine O’Rourke, Databases of Transitional Justice Mechanisms
and Contexts: Comparing Research Purposes and Design, 10(3) INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 492 (2016)
(discussing the growth of databases characterizing the implementation of transitional justice in
different cases); Oskar N.T. Thoms et al., State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?,
4(3) INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 329 (2010).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at
art. 8 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2 ¶ 3, Dec. 16,
1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Rome Statute, supra note 1 at art. 68, 75; African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 7.
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respect to reparations follow from the essential right to a remedy contained in
both human rights and humanitarian law treaties.5 Delivering remedies in
practice has proven challenging for states not only in the provision of adequate
resources, but in providing fair, transparent, and accessible processes to victims
of serious human rights violations in a consistent and effective way.

A. History of the Trust Fund and the Legal Basis for the
Assistance Mandate
The Trust Fund was created under the Rome Statute as a unique
mechanism “for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court, and of the families of such victims.”6 The Trust Fund has a dual mandate:
first, to deliver general assistance to conflict victims without prejudice to
ongoing proceedings of the Court, and second, to enforce the reparations orders
of the Court.7 Uniquely, the Trust Fund (TFV) can be put into operation before
a ruling is made, and it has the capacity to benefit victim survivors who have not
yet gone to Court.8

B. The Relationship between Reparations and Assistance
Reparations are increasingly part of the package of measures that
accompany post-conflict and post-atrocity legal remedy and reform.9 Restitution
has moved to the center of global discussions about remedy based on a
recognition that transition requires not only doing something to address the
actions of perpetrators, but also to specifically address the needs of victims.10
Reparations come in multiple forms, ranging from individual financial
5

6
7
8

9
10

While the term reparation is used in many contexts, in international law it has generally been
understood to designate measures to be adopted for the redress of various harms resulting from
certain crimes or breaches of state responsibility. The move from state to individual remedy in
this context is a significant shift in its own right. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess. , April
23–June 1, July 2–August 10, 2001, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at arts. 1, 31 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles]; Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 453 (Pablo
de Greiff ed., 2006).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 79(1).
Id. at art. 79–80.
Id. at art. 79; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNIICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence]. At the pre-judgement stage the Trust Fund’s role is to provide
“assistance”, which does not detract or limit the capacity of any victim to receive reparations
following judicial findings in particular cases.
See de Greiff, supra note 5, at Introduction, 1–18.
Id. at 1–2.

494

Vol. 19 No. 2

Between Reparations and Repair

Dutton & Ní Aoláin

compensation to more innovative forms of group and community compensation
of material, social, or financial benefits.11 Some reparations have no financial
component, but are symbolic, demonstrative, or memorial in nature.12
Despite a greater commitment to reparations evidenced in both
international criminal law13 and multiple transitional justice processes,14 there are
few examples of functional and well-delivered reparations in practice. The
creation of such processes remains a work in progress and the international
community continues to grapple with the financial, entitlement, and fairness
elements of undertaking reparative work. The lack of good examples of
reparations working in practice follows from a dearth of comprehensive
reparations programming and the relatively new implementation of reparations
in conflict and post-conflict sites.15
Reparations are provided for in Article 75(2) of the Rome Statute. The
Statute specifically designates that fines, forfeitures, and reparations can be
ordered by the Court against convicted individuals.16 At the heart of the
reparations regime envisaged by the Statute is a nexus between the conviction of
the individual and compensation to the individuals to whom harm has been
caused.17 The Rome Statute envisages that the Trust Fund will have a role as
implementer of select reparations awards ordered by the Court. 18 Broadly, the
Fund’s work is divided into two parts. Tom Dannenbaum reflects on these rules
noting the unique autonomy of the Trust Fund with respect to the funds:
Sub-paragraphs 2-4 of Rule 98 define ways in which the Court interacts with
the Fund – 98 (2) providing that the Court can order that awards for
reparation against a convicted person be deposited in the TFV for a period
of time, 98 (3) enabling the Court to order that a reparations order [sic]
11

de Greiff, supra note 5, at Part II Thematic Studies, 450–698.

12

Id.
See, for example, DINAH SHELTON & THORDIS INGADOTTIR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT REPARATIONS TO VICTIMS OF CRIMES (ARTICLE 75 OF THE ROME STATUTE) AND THE
TRUST FUND (ARITCLE 79) [sic]: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE (Center on International Cooperation at New York University ed., 1999),
http://perma.cc/296T-S9NS.

13

14

See, for example, Maxime Kersh, The Empowerment of the Crime Victim: A Comparative Study of Victim
Compensation Schemes in the United States and Australia, 24 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 345 (1994).

15

See for example, Julián Guerrero Orozco & Mariana Goetz, Reparations for Victims in Colombia:
Colombia’s Law on Justice and Peace, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 435, 457–58 (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at 75(2); International Criminal Court Res. ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, annex,
Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, ¶ 21 (Dec. 3, 2005), http://perma.cc/WB7M-7T42)
[hereinafter Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims].

16

17
18

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at 79; Regulations of the Trust Fund Victims, supra note 16.
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 8, at 98.
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pursuant to Article 75(2) be executed through the Fund, and 98(4) allowing
for and regulating the payment of reparations through the TFV to
NGOs . . . The Rules thus provide for a division between funds earmarked
for eventual use for reparations, over which the Court retains authority, and
“other resources” over which the TFV appears to have greater control.
Read in conjunction with Article 79(1), Rule 98(5) provides for a sphere of
activity . . . in which the TFV is to act pursuant to the limits defined
separately by the [Assembly of States Parties] ASP, with no basis in the
Statute or the Rules for ICC oversight.19

Complementary to the reparations regime is the assistance mandate of
TFV, which enables the Fund to exercise a general assistance mandate in
situations under investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC).20 After
notifying the Court of its intention to provide assistance, the TFV uses voluntary
contributions from donors to provide victims and their families with physical
rehabilitation, material support, and psychological rehabilitation.21 This
assistance work has been under-examined by scholars and practitioners, both in
terms of its singular contribution to holistic justice for victims as well as its
relationship to the provision of reparations by the ICC system. This Article gives
an insight into the operation and effectiveness of the Trust Fund’s assistance
mandate, offering observations on the contributions of assistance to victims as a
stand-alone category.

II. R ESEARCH O VERVIEW
A. The Rationale that Drove this Study
This Article publishes the findings of an investigation of the operation of
the Trust Fund’s assistance mandate in Northern Uganda.22 It identifies
19

20

21
22

Tom Dannenbaum, The International Criminal Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice: The Case for an
Independent Trust Fund for Victims, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 234, 249–50 (2010).
Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, supra note 16. Part III of the Regulations addresses the
“Activities and Projects of the Trust Fund.” The processes for use of the Trust Fund’s resources
are set out in Chapter I, Section I, ¶ 42, which frames this responsibility by noting that “[t]he
Resources of the Trust Fund shall be for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court, as defined in rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence . . . .” Chapter I, Section
II, ¶ 43 defines the role of the Trust Fund when resources are collected and transferred through
fines and forfeiture. Chapter I, Section III, ¶¶ 47–48 of the Regulations define how “[o]ther
Resources of the Trust Fund” will be used.
Id. at ¶ 48.
It builds on a longstanding relationship between Professor Ní Aoláin and the Trust Fund. In
2015, Professor Ní Aoláin led an Expert Consultation mandated by the ICC on Developing the Trust
Fund for Victims’ Reparation Draft Implementation Plan for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Conviction at the
International Criminal Court. Ní Aoláin was also one of a number of interveners in the litigation
concerning the implementation of the Reparations Plan prepared by the Trust Fund at the ICC in
2016. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber II, Order on the Conduct of
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successes and limitations in hopes of illuminating best practices on repair, at
both a conceptual and operational level, using the assistance mandate as a lever
to explore broader themes and practicalities. The assistance mandate provides a
valuable case study on the importance of preparing and working with postconflict communities as they engage in the hard work of post-conflict justice.
The lessons learned from assistance implementation in Northern Uganda may
provide roadmaps for future assistance mandate work and eventual reparation
programs in Uganda and beyond, given broad similarities in the challenges of
implementing remedies for victims of serious human rights violations across
jurisdictions.
A key driver for this research was the specific request by the International
Criminal Court Trial Chamber II to provide evidence of best practice in
reparations in prior litigation involving the Trust Fund.23 As the Trial Chamber
II grappled with the implementation of reparations after the conclusion of the
criminal findings in the Lubanga Trial, it invited “State[s] and organizations” 24
and stakeholders with “detailed knowledge of the context in which Mr. Lubanga
committed the crimes . . . and of the social and cultural groups from which his
victims originate,”25 to provide observations to the Chamber addressing the
viability of collective reparations programs for Mr. Lubanga’s victims. The
Chamber indicated that it sought further information to shape its judicial
approach to collective reparations.26 Specifically, the Court sought information
to inform its judicial decision-making on past and current reparations projects
for former child soldiers and on collective reparations.27 A challenge for the
Court, and for those submitting observations to it, was the absence of robust
empirical assessments of existing or prior reparations programming. Collective
and individual reparations for mass atrocity crimes is a new venture for states
and international institutions alike. The measurement of success (or failure) of
the Hearing to Be Held on 11 and 13 October 2016, ¶ 3 (Oct. 6, 2016); Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
ICC-01/04-01/06-3251, Trial Chamber II, Order Approving the Proposed Plan of the Trust
Fund for Victims in Relation to Symbolic Collective Reparations (Oct. 21, 2016); see also
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/05-01/08-3444, Trial Chamber II, Submission by QUB Human
Rights Centre on Reparations Issues Pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute (Mar. 16, 2018).
23

The Chamber was Presided by Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, with Judge Olga Herrera
Carbuccia and Judge Péter Kovács in Prosecutor v. Lubanga.

24

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Order Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 2, at ¶¶ 5, 7.

25

Id. at ¶ 7; see also id. at ¶ 6 (“The Chamber considers that, under the mandate it was granted in the
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 3 March 2015, and in the light of the information provided
to date by the TFV, it lacks the collective reparation projects for the victims of Mr. Lubanga
which would allow it to fulfill its mandate.”).

26

Id. at ¶¶ 6–8.
Id. at ¶ 8.

27
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such endeavors is hampered both by the lack of longitudinal data, and
agreement on what might count as measurements of success or failure.28 It is
further hampered by the existence of few studies with ethically robust validation
to ensure that the assessments themselves do not cause further trauma or harm
to vulnerable populations. The need for such data, as well as a commitment to
ethically sound approaches to assessment prompted this study.
The analysis was also inspired by the theoretical and analytical approach of
“critical friendship” between scholars and practitioners and the value of such
positioning to good policy outcomes and robust research.29 The term “critical
friendship” was defined by Mackay et al., as an approach to investigation,
research and evaluation offering “sympathetic critique and [making] contextual
judgment.”30 The notion of “critical friend” situates this study as taking a middle
position between those who strongly critique involvement with and decisions
taken by the entity or institution under study and those who unreservedly
champion such institutions. The model of “critical friend” characterizes the
substance and approach of this study, allowing us to examine the Trust Fund’s
work in its realistic, contextual, temporal, and cultural contexts, aware of our
own privilege and externalities, mindful of the importance of evaluation, but also
attuned to listening and understanding.

B. Theory and Applied Methodology
The findings presented in this Article are derived from a series of in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with staff of the TFV, the ICC, and the organizations
contracted with the Trust Fund to carry out the assistance mandate
programming in Northern Uganda (“implementing partners”). Time and
resource constraints limited implementing partners interviews to the four
organizations based in the town of Gulu: Association of Volunteers in
International Service (AVSI) Foundation; Transcultural Psychological
Association (TPA) – Uganda; Gulu Women’s Economic Development &
Globalization (GWED-G); and the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT). All of
28

29

30

Kirsten Ainley, Evaluating the Evaluators: Transitional Justice and the Contest of Values, 11 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 421, 421–22, 426 (2017) (“A wide range of factors are claimed within the
literature to demonstrate the success or failure of TJ mechanisms, with no strategies offered to
adjudicate between rival foci and methods of appraisal.”).
LOUISE CHAPPELL, THE POLITICS OF GENDER JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
LEGACIES AND LEGITIMACY 9 (2016).
Id. (quoting Fiona Mackay & Louise Chappell, Critical Friends and De(con)structive Critics:
Dilemmas of Feminist Engagement with Global Governance and Gender Reform Agendas,
presented at European Consortium for Political Research, 4th European Conference on Politics
and Gender (June 11–13, 2015)); see also Fiona Mackay et al., New Institutionalism Through a Gender
Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?, 31 INT’L POL. SCI. R. 573, 574–79 (2010).
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the on-site research was carried out in the summer of 2017, but extensive
preparation and consultation took place throughout autumn 2016 and spring
2017, supported by the Human Rights Laboratory at the University of
Minnesota. The laboratory provided interdisciplinary review and critique of the
evaluation methodology, ethical dilemmas, as well as the feasibility of the
research delivery on the ground in Uganda. We recognize that reliance on Trust
Fund partners has methodological and substantive consequences, not least
because of the relationships of dependence, funding, and expectations between
field implementers and the body prompting the work. We hope our critical
approach to both the Trust Fund and its partners ameliorates some of those
limitations, but we acknowledge it may not resolve all tensions, biases, or
conflicts.
A total of twenty-six people were interviewed in The Hague and Gulu
using an interview guide built off of our prior work on reparations and
augmented by a comprehensive literature review. The intent was to carry out inperson, individual interviews lasting approximately an hour. However, in three
instances, scheduling constraints required conducting interviews in small groups
of two to three interviewees. In two different instances, in-person interviews
were not possible and the interview was conducted over the phone. Interviews
were then recorded, transcribed, and coded to develop the analysis presented
here.31
The staff of the Trust Fund led recruitment efforts for this project. For
each of the four implementing partners, the TFV program manager connected
the interviewer to organizational leadership; they then coordinated directly with
the interviewer to determine which staff were available and willing to be
interviewed. The first priority was interviews with programmatic staff, though
interviews with leadership and evaluation staff were also included where
possible. With respect to interviews with staff of the Trust Fund and the ICC,
the TFV monitoring and evaluation officer identified those individuals whose
work was most relevant to the functioning of the assistance mandate in
Northern Uganda and facilitated interview arrangements.
The formal interviews were preceded by one week at the ICC in The
Hague, reviewing secondary data related to the Uganda assistance mandate.
Additional primary data came from two days of field observation with social
workers and staff of TPO – Uganda as well as a week of observation at a
conference convened by the Trust Fund in Kampala. This conference was a
collaborative gathering to discuss and revise the Trust Fund’s new performance
31

To preserve anonymity, each interviewee has been assigned a letter (for example, Participant “A”)
which is used when sharing their words in citations throughout this article. Audio recordings,
transcripts, and/or general notes on all interviews are available on file with the authors.
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monitoring program. All eight implementing partners currently working in the
country were in attendance, allowing for informal interactions with
implementing partners beyond the four Gulu-based organizations.
The research was further informed by observational and field experience
acquired by spending an extended period of time in both The Hague and Gulu.
To state the very obvious, both contexts are exceptionally different, offering
different cultural and operative constraints, and the observations of institutional
context, geography, and situated realities also infuse the analysis and conclusions
of this Article.

C. Ethical Considerations and Limitations
This project presented a variety of ethical considerations. First and
foremost were ethical concerns about directly interacting with and interviewing
beneficiaries of the assistance mandate.32 Given the relatively short amount of
time spent in-country (and considering the kind of long-term commitment
required to ethically engage with traumatized individuals and communities), the
lack of pre-existing relationships, the cultural and linguistic limitations of the
interviewer, and the nuance required to conduct interviews without raising false
expectations or re-traumatizing people, the project did not involve interviews
with beneficiaries/victims. Though such interviews would undoubtedly be an
invaluable source of information about the efficacy and success of the assistance
mandate, it was determined that meeting the ethical requirements for such
interviews was outside the scope of this project.33 Relatedly, time constraints
limited the opportunity to obtain viewpoints from other stakeholders in the
community—for example, government officials or other nonprofit
organizations. As such, this research does not purport to represent an exhaustive
study of the perceptions on assistance mandate in the region. By focusing on
one group of interviewees—going deep rather than wide—it intends to provide
a thorough examination of how those directly involved in the implementation of
the assistance mandate view their work.
Prior to all direct interviews, the interviewer explained that responses
would be kept confidential and all interviewees gave informed consent to their
participation. Despite these procedural precautions, the realities of the situation
32

33

Heather McCosker et al., Undertaking Sensitive Research: Issues and Strategies for Meeting the Safety Needs
of All Participants, 2 F. QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. 1, 22 (2001); Andrea Doucet & Natasha S.
Mauthner, Knowing Responsibly: Ethics, Feminist Epistemologies and Methodologies, in ETHICS IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 122, (Miller et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
Because interviews were only conducted with programmatic staff, the Institutional Review Board
of the University of Minnesota classified this project as exempt research after a complete
preliminary institutional review board (IRB).
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bear consideration—including that interviews with implementing partners
occurred at the request of a major funder. Notwithstanding the interviewer’s
explanation that she did not work for the Trust Fund, it is possible that the
perceived close relationship between the interviewer and the Trust Fund
influenced the answers given during the interview.34 Additionally, in light of the
relatively small number of interviewees and the distinctive program models of
each implementing partner, it is likely that some interviewees felt that, even with
anonymized data, their answers could be traced back to them. Responses may
also have been colored by the general difficulty of providing objective selfevaluation.
There are inherent challenges when researchers from another culture
attempt to observe and analyze the happenings of a different society. The
interviewer was of a different race and class than the vast majority of
interviewees and several interviewees completed the interview in a non-primary
language (English).35 Though the interviewer attempted to mitigate these factors,
power dynamics and mistaken assumptions on the part of the interviewer surely
influence the findings of this project. Finally, this project is a relatively brief
look, undertaken by outsiders, at a region that is enormously complex. The
investigators endeavor to provide an analysis reflective of the diversity and
history of the Gulu district, but the risk of oversimplification remains.

D. Brief History of the Conflict
Without digressing to a historical treatise of the conflict between the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) and the government in Northern Uganda, a couple of
significant factual matters are notable.36 The origins of the conflict, which
34

Tina Miller & Linda Bell, Consenting to What? Issues of Access, Gate-Keeping and ‘Informed’ Consent, in
Miller, ETHICS IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 32, at 61–75.

35

SVERKER FINNSTRÖM, LIVING WITH BAD SURROUNDINGS: WAR AND EXISTENTIAL UNCERTAINTY
IN ACHOLILAND, NORTHERN UGANDA (2003); see Shannon Speed, At the Crossroads of Human
Rights and Anthropology: Toward a Critically Engaged Activist Research, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 66
(2006) (discussing issues of colonization between the researcher and the researched); Social Identity
and Power in Researcher-Researched Dynamics, in DONNALYN POMPPER, PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFULLY DOING DIFFERENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS (INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION, VOL. 1) 25 (1st ed., 2014) (discussing
power differences between the researcher and the researched); Niamh Mulcahy, Narrating
Developmental Disability: Researchers, Advocates, and the Creation of an Interview Space in the Context of
University-Community Partnerships, 11(2) INT’L J. OF QUAL. METHODS 165, 166–67 (2012) (discussing
perceptions of the external researcher); Richard Hugman et al., When ‘Do No Harm’ Is not Enough:
The Ethics of Research with Refugees and Other Vulnerable Groups, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 1271 (2011)
(discussing the ethical principle of ‘do no harm’ in research).
See generally A. B. K. KASOZI, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE IN UGANDA, 1964-1985 (1994)
(discussing the conflict as relevant to the experiences of persons living through the conflict in
Northern Uganda).
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primarily took place from 1986 to 2008, can generally be traced back to colonial
times and the divide and conquer strategies deployed by British colonizers that
deepened divisions between ethnic groups.37 The British colonizers encouraged
internal geographical boundaries (here North-South binaries), ethnic
distinctions, and pursued strategies of economic and political favoritism among
local populations.38 Colonialism also established and solidified socio-economic
rifts and promoted militarism. This was then compounded by corrupt and
neglectful presidential politics in the post-colonial era.39 Post-colonial
governance was characterized by coups (for example, Colonel Idi Amin’s rise to
power) that instigated an era of ingrained violence, systemic human rights
violations, and brutal civil war.40 Northern Uganda played a pivotal role in these
upheavals, providing military backbone to various uprisings as well as being a
battleground in the literal sense.41 The emergence of the LRA from prior
iterations, drawing on a spiritual movement (inspired by a young woman called
Alice Auma) and led by Joseph Kony was the result of complex infighting
among various non-state actors groups in the region. It was sustained by longstanding anti-government sentiment in Northern Uganda and in particular the
Acholi homelands.42 Kony consolidated his leadership in the early 1990s, and led
a violent, increasingly disparate band of irregulars committing widespread
human rights and humanitarian law violations.43 The violent and unrestrained
response of the government resulted in sustained violations perpetrated by state
actors, encircling and creating further misery for the civilian population.44 The
violence was defined by systematic attacks on civilians, the widespread use of
sexual violence against men and women, the forcible recruitment of child
soldiers, torture, disappearances and wide-scale violations of a range of
fundamental human rights.45 It is this complex history of war, and explicitly its
most recent iteration with the LRA, that led to the ICC’s legal intervention,

37

KASOZI, supra note 36, at 17–29.

38

Id. at 22–26.
See Hema Chatlani, Uganda: A Society in Crisis, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 277, 279 (2007).

39
40
41
42
43
44

45

Id. at 280.
Id.
Chatlani, supra note 39, at 281–285.
Id.
See, for example, TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 41–52 (Zed Books, 2006); Adam Branch, The Responsibility to Protect:
What is the Basis for the Emerging Norm of R2P?, THINK AFRICA PRESS (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://perma.cc/PME2-QR44; CHRIS DOLAN, SOCIAL TORTURE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN
UGANDA, 1986–2006 (Nov. 6, 2009).
Allen, supra note 44, at 17, 53–71, 113–14; Dolan, supra note 44, at 39–61.
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spurred by the Ugandan government’s invitation to exercise Court jurisdiction
over crimes committed during the conflict in Northern Uganda.46

E. Brief Introduction to the Implementing Partners and
Their Operations
The implementing partners interviewed for this project all maintain
regional offices in the town of Gulu, the capital of Gulu District, and carry out
programming in villages throughout both Gulu District and neighboring
districts. Since 2015, the principle focus of the assistance mandate program in
Northern Uganda has been to provide physical and psychological rehabilitation
programming; however material assistance (for example, livelihood activities,
Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA)) remain an important aspect of
projects.47
Many of the implementing partners interviewed for this research use a
similar programmatic framework for delivering psychological or physical
rehabilitation. In general, work commences in a new community with a
community mobilization, wherein staff work with local leaders to encourage
local people to attend an information session. These sessions, often called
“community sensitizations,” introduce the assistance mandate work and the
eligibility requirements for services—most notably, the requirement that the
person must have suffered harm after July 1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC went into force. The community sensitization also includes
preliminary psychoeducation about trauma and begins community dialogue
about stigma and conflict experiences.
After the sensitization, the implementing partners invite those people who
think they may be eligible and in need of services to contact them, at which
point the implementing partners complete intakes and screening protocols. Most
implementing partners providing psychological rehabilitation do so via a form of
group cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), a standardized treatment protocol
able to be delivered to groups of approximately fifteen people meeting once a
week for about ten weeks.48 The Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) follows a
similar group therapy schedule, but employs its own standardized group
46
47

48

Allen, supra note 44, at 82.
Press Release, International Criminal Court, The Trust Fund for Victims Launches New
Assistance Projects in Northern Uganda, ICC-TFV-20150703-PR1126 (July 3, 2015),
http://perma.cc/L33E-CVHA; see also Integrated Physical and Psychological Rehabilitation Assistance for
Victims in Northern Uganda, REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST, EOI 124415 (Feb. 8, 2018).
See generally Andrew C. Butler et al., The Empirical Status of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: A Review of
Meta-Analyses, 26 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 17 (2006) (summarizing the literature on treatment
outcomes of CBT).
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treatment protocol.49 In many cases, beneficiaries who qualify for services also
have the option of receiving individual or family therapy as needed. For those
beneficiaries needing physical rehabilitation, the implementing partners have
limited funding to refer people to health centers or hospitals for surgeries. After
the group sessions conclude, the implementing partners conduct at least one or
more formal follow-up engagements, though securing these subsequent
meetings can sometimes be challenging.
In addition to the psychological services described above, TPO also runs a
clinic outreach program. Once a month, TPO brings two doctors from the
regional hospital in Gulu to a rural health center where the doctors spend a day
meeting with beneficiaries who could benefit from psychotropic medication in
addition to therapy. While the doctors are meeting with beneficiaries
individually, TPO staff conducts intakes and provides psychoeducation to those
waiting. If a person receives a prescription, drugs purchased by TPO are
provided that same day.
CVT also plays a unique role in the psychological rehabilitation work.
CVT’s project in Northern Uganda originally focused solely on capacitybuilding. CVT staff spent several years providing training and supervision to the
staff of other nonprofits, including other implementing partners, to improve the
standards of psychological care available in the region. In 2015, CVT expanded
to also provide its own direct group and individual services, but capacitybuilding remains an important part of its work.50
One of the interviewed implementing partners, AVSI, provides physical
rehabilitation in the form of prosthetics and orthotics.51 Now in partnership with
the Ugandan government, AVSI runs the Gulu Regional Orthopedics Workshop
(GROW), which is one of the few facilities in Uganda capable of manufacturing
artificial limbs.52 When a beneficiary comes to GROW, AVSI social workers
provide the first phase of intervention, helping the person work through the
psychological challenge of living with a disability.53 The beneficiary then works
with GROW technicians and physical therapists to fit and begin to use the
artificial limb.54 After the person returns home, a team consisting of a technician,
physical therapist, and social worker travel out to see him or her after three
49

Healing the Wounds of Torture, THE CENTER
SDGT.

50

See Uganda: Healing in Northern Uganda, THE CENTER
http://perma.cc/236K-Y2YW.
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AVSI, AVSI FOUNDATION IN UGANDA 13 (2016), http://perma.cc/2E7G-UM74.
Id.

52
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AVSI, supra note 51, at 11.
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months for an initial assessment of functioning and to perform any adjustments
needed.55

F. Explanation of Key Questions
Driven by the broad goals outlined in Part II.A, the interviews sought to
elucidate the efficacy and success in practice (at the granular level) of assistance
mandate programs provided by the International Criminal Court’s Trust Fund
for Victims in Northern Uganda—and thus identify successes and challenges
currently facing the program. Questioning was intended to focus on the
particulars and practicalities of implementation at the ground level. This kind of
analysis could be reduced to a box-ticking exercise (counting how many services,
events or interventions were delivered), but this kind of numerical count was not
the object of the exercise. Rather, the goal was to collect a sense of the lived
experience of delivering services, engaging with clients, and noticing the effects
of the programming as well as to draw out self-reflection from the providers as
much as possible. From this, the interviews provided a basis to assess the extent
to which the Trust Fund for Victims is discharging its assistance mandate as set
out in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

III. D EFINING A SSISTA NCE M ANDATE S UCCESS
In discharging its mandate, the Trust Fund has been active in several
countries where the ICC is involved; utilizing its second mandate of awarding
general assistance, not reparations, the Trust Fund is providing a broad range of
support.56 The assistance mandate has been premised on working with local
organizations, victim survivor groups, women’s associations, faith-based
organizations, and village savings and loans associations as well as international
non-governmental organizations.57
The TFV self-reports that it is reaching more than 104,000 beneficiaries in
two situations currently under ICC investigation through rehabilitation
assistance projects in Northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.58 Activities were planned in the Central African Republic, but were

55

Id.
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Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, supra note 16, at Part III, Chapter I, Section III,
“Other Resources of the Trust Fund.”
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, NEWSLETTER #3, 11 (May 2017).
Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Trust Fund for Victims Assists over 80,000
Victims, Raises Reparations Reserve, ICC-TFV-20120323-PR780 (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://perma.cc/568L-MQA2.
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suspended due to security concerns in 2013.59 The TFV prioritized four areas in
its initial assistance mandate work: (1) justice and reconciliation; (2) health and
well-being; (3) social support and integration; and (4) material security.60 While
these priorities have evolved over time, in part due to financial and operational
constraints, they provide a window into the broad set of needs that emerge in
the assistance framework. The TFV views gender as a cross-cutting theme across
these priority areas.61 Based on Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute (formally
recognizing that categorization into highly singular groups of victim status has
many pitfalls), the TFV identifies the following groups as priorities:
• Victims of sexual and gender-based violence
• Widows/widowers
• Former child soldiers and abducted youth
• Orphans and vulnerable children62
One of the unique aspects of the ICC system is its dual commitment to
criminal accountability and concurrently to the rights and needs of victims. The
Trust Fund represents a unique institutional innovation, not least because it can
be operationalized before a ruling is made, providing the capacity to benefit
victim survivors in situations still under investigation and pending before the
Court. This institutionalizes the understanding that effective participation in
international criminal justice processes requires prior support and prior capacity
building for affected individuals and communities. As the sites of ICC
investigation reveal,63 victims are often found in the most marginalized and
vulnerable communities, with limited education, health, and social capital; the
assistance mandate levels the playing field slightly.

59

Press Release, International Criminal Court, Following Mr. Bemba’s Acquittal Trust Fund for
Victims, ICC Decides to Accelerate Launch (June 13, 2018), http://perma.cc/2DXP-F68Q (“In
2013, the Fund was close to launching the assistance mandate programme in CAR focused on
SGBV victims, but activities were suspended and eventually cancelled due to the security
situation.”).

60

TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, REVIEWING REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE AND PREPARING FOR
DELIVERING REPARATIONS: PROGRAMME PROGRESS REPORT 3–4 (2011), http://perma.cc/4DR5N9TM. In Northern Uganda emphasis had been placed on economic empowerment and
reconstructive surgery and in DRC psychological support and counseling. However, after the
suspension of material support these priorities have been re-shaped.
Id.
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Id. at 5.
See ICC, SITUATIONS UNDER INVESTIGATION, http://perma.cc/DX8V-E38M.
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A. Reparation Scales
1. The individual is the foundational scale of the Trust Fund’s work.
A focus on the individual is at the heart of the international criminal justice
enterprise as it is individuals who experience and live with the consequences of
harm. The necessity of individual remedy is at the heart of international human
rights law standards. Crucially, most human rights and humanitarian law treaties
provide the right to a remedy. These treaty obligations include processes that are
supported by procedural rights to a fair hearing and fair process.64 In the context
of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law, rehabilitation and
guarantees of non-repetition have emerged as vital elements of remedy in
practice. The other core elements of reparations include recognition of
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.
Soft law standards have emerged more recently to complement and
augment these treaty standards. The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law is an important recent
contribution to the consolidation of reparations practice regarding the rights of
the individual in the aftermath of mass atrocity.65 The Basic Principles underscore
obligations in relation to the delivery of justice to victims post-conflict including,
inter alia, ensuring “effective access to justice”66 and the provision of “effective
remedies to victims, including reparation.”67 In parallel, the individual’s right to
acknowledgement and individual recognition is a critical takeaway from the
jurisprudence of international human rights’ bodies and the practice of various
transitional justice mechanisms.
The Trust Fund’s approach in its assistance mandate evidences a strong
commitment to mirroring relevant best practices endorsed by the Basic Principles.
This is most potently illustrated by the centrality of individual victims. The broad
definition of “victim” encompassed by the assistance mandate reflects the
approach of the Basic Principles.68 The Basic Principles state that “victims are
persons who individually or collectively suffered harm” and defines the term
64

Neumeister v. Austria, App. No. 1936/63, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91, ¶¶ 22–25 (1974).

65

G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, at 3 (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter
The Basic Principles].
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Id. at ¶ 3(c).
Id. at ¶ 3(d).

67
68

The Basic Principles, supra note 65, at ¶ 8; Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, supra note
16, ¶¶ 42, 46 (citing to Rules of Procedure and Evidence 85).
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“victims” to include “the immediate family or dependents of the direct victim
and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress
or prevent victimization.”69 Further, the Basic Principles affirm that rehabilitation
“should include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social
services.”70 That commitment is echoed in the Trust Fund’s commitment to
addressing material, physical, and psychological harms.71 As seen in the Trust
Fund’s fieldwork approach set out below, rehabilitation could also be conceived
of as including broader victim empowerment through education and adopting a
rights-based framework within which to situate a victim’s understanding of the
harm inflicted upon him or her.

2. The Trust Fund engages with the family and community scales of
reparations.
Another important element of the approach to the assistance mandate, one
that is also intrinsically relevant to the delivery of reparations, is how to address
and manage collective harms, collective experiences, and community needs.
Systematic human rights and humanitarian law violations represent a complex
blend of physical, moral, emotional, and social harms that are both individual
and collective with immediate and intergenerational impacts.72 This dual reality
of collective and individual experience is also found in the Basic Principles’
acknowledgment that “victims” are “persons who individually or collectively
suffered harm . . .”73
The notion of collective harm reflects not only individual experiences of
violence and harm but affirms people’s layered and multiple identities. It also
affirms that in all cultures and contexts (including in Northern Uganda)
community is a necessity, an identity, and an inescapable reality of daily life.
Importantly, gross and systematic violations of human rights are often intended
to destroy communities and groups, creating harm that is communal and shared.
In this context, individual remedy alone misses a crucial aspect of the reparative
needs of community and an important symbolic need, felt at multiple levels.
Hence, the Trust Fund’s work at the community level is not an added “extra,”
but rather an essential and logical response to the harm experienced by the
communities it serves. This critical dimension of harm has often been
overlooked by international human rights bodies whose focus and jurisprudence
69
70
71
72
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The Basic Principles, supra note 65, at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 21.
Regulations of the Trust Fund Victims, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 48, 50(a)(i).
See Nathaniel Vincent Mohatt, et al., Historical Trauma as Public Narrative: A Conceptual Review of How
History Impacts Present-Day Health, 106 SOC. SCI. MED. 128 (2014).
The Basic Principles, supra note 65, at ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
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has primarily addressed individual harms over many decades. The centrality of
the communal, and the necessity of working through the community in light of
the nature of the harms being addressed is amply illustrated by the interviews
that form the basis of this research.

3. The Trust Fund also works on a governmental scale.
Though not as readily apparent from the text of the assistance mandate,
work with the Ugandan government is an important part of the assistance
mandate. The vital services provided by the assistance mandate should formally
be the responsibility of the Ugandan government.74 The physical and
psychological care of Ugandan citizens should not rest on an international entity
and nonprofit organizations. Interviewees at all levels described efforts to ensure
the successful operation of the assistance mandate did not allow the government
to excuse its failure to provide a basic standard of care to its citizens. The
situation in Northern Uganda exposes the tension between the obligations of the
state and its inability or unwillingness to uphold those obligations, a tension that
pervades much reparations practice throughout the globe.75 As such, work with
the government to increase its own capacity and accountability is an important
level of engagement for a successful assistance mandate, but comes with its own
complexities to ensure a parallel level of state responsibility and engagement.

B. TFV Evaluation Practices
Evaluating the overall impact of the assistance mandate is complicated by
the reality—widely affirmed by the implementing partners—that rehabilitation is
more appropriately thought of as an ongoing process than as a quantifiable endstate; this makes defining “success” very difficult.76 Acknowledging this
complexity, the Trust Fund has undertaken an overhaul of its evaluation

74

Uganda has signed the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ratified 1987) which
mandates that the State provide a minimal threshold of health and education rights for citizens.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ.,
Soc., and Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16
and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/UGA/1 (Dec. 5, 2013).
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Lauren Marie Balasco, Reparative Development: Re-Conceptualising Reparations in Transitional Justice
Processes, 17 J. CONFLICT, SEC. & DEV. 1, 2 (2017).
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TFV Monitoring & Evaluation Conference, Kampala, Uganda (July 4, 2017) (discussing
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program in recent years, so as to better capture the impact of the assistance
mandate, rather than just its outputs.77
For the first seven years of the program in Uganda, the Trust Fund used a
quarterly reporting template to collect basic statistics on the beneficiaries,
including their age, sex, and type of assistance received (for example, physical or
psychological rehabilitation). Implementing partners were also asked to complete
a general narrative on the achievements and challenges of their work over the
quarter and mark their progress on the objectives identified in their grant
proposal. This evaluation scheme had several limitations. The key pragmatic
challenge was varying degrees of compliance and consistency among
implementing partners, attributed in part to the open-ended structure of the
narrative portion. Relatedly, the evaluation format was highly focused on
outputs and the use of terms without clear definitions (for example, what does
“psychological rehabilitation” mean?) limited the utility of these reports in
evaluating how well the assistance mandate as a whole was working.78
Recognizing these limitations, the Trust Fund embarked on an ambitious
overhaul of its evaluation program.79 The new performance monitoring plan
seeks to improve both the consistency and quality of information captured in the
quarterly reports while better aligning the evaluation indicators with the Trust
Fund’s strategic goals.80
As such, the performance monitoring plan is intended to provide
significantly more structure and guidance to implementing partners. Though it
continues to track outputs, the Trust Fund strives to capture more of the overall
outcomes associated with specific interventions. To this end, the Trust Fund
hosted a gathering of all implementing partners in Kampala in July 2017, setting
aside a week to discuss the best way to develop a standardized protocol to track
progress towards the amorphous ultimate goals of physical and psychological
“rehabilitation.”81 In addition to the challenges of evaluating improvements in
individuals, efforts to obtain an overall sense of the Trust Fund’s impact in the
region are complicated by the enormous difficulties of ascertaining the full
extent of the harms suffered. The Trust Fund’s willingness to struggle with

77
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For example, knowing many people completed psychological programming (output) versus
knowing the effect of such programming on individual well-being (impact).
Interview with Participant A, in The Hague, Netherlands (June 21, 2017) (notes on file with
authors).
Id.; see also TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, TFV STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, Annex 1, Global
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (2016) [hereinafter Strategic Plan] (on file with
authors).
Strategic Plan, supra note 79, Annex 1.
TFV Monitoring & Evaluation Conference, supra note 76.
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translating amorphous ideals of healing and recovery into a standardized
evaluation method that captures the contextualized impact of its work is
commendable.
This research sought to ascertain how those involved in the mandate
personally understood and evaluated their work. The goal of the interviews was
to capture at a relatively intuitive level how those implementing the assistance
mandate programming on the ground knew when their work was successful. As
such, the indicators described in the subsequent section are generally ill-suited
for inclusion in a standardized evaluation program. They are not presented with
the goal that they could be directly incorporated into such a standardized
protocol, but rather to provide additional perspectives on the assistance
mandate. These indicators are presented in hopes of sparking a greater
understanding of the elusive definition of a “successful assistance mandate,” as
well as shaping international law discourses concerning the scope of
implementation of reparations broadly defined.

1. The indicators should not be considered in isolation.
As in other post-conflict contexts, the complex nature of the harms
inflicted in Northern Uganda means physical rehabilitation, for example, is never
as simple as merely providing a person with an artificial limb.82 While the goals
of the assistance mandate are framed at the individual level, the scope of the
trauma endured by the region demands significant work at the family,
community, and national levels in order to provide meaningful, sustainable
services to individuals.83 Interviewees expressed an awareness of, and
appreciation for, the multiple identities of each individual, explaining that
remedying the harms suffered by individuals necessarily includes an examination
of how those harms have impacted an individual’s identity as a relative or
community member as well as that individual’s personal well-being.84 The

82

83
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Interview with Participant K, in Gulu, Uganda (June 30, 2017) (“First of all, you know, when we
talk about ‘restore hope,’ the limb alone cannot restore hope. That’s why there’s importance in
the talking aspect, the counseling aspect. And then we don’t end there.”) (transcript on file with
authors).
Interview with Participants E, F, & G, in Gulu, Uganda (June 29, 2017) (“So you give
psychoeducation to the families as well, tell them the importance of their member of that family
taking that medicine . . . Some of them initially, before—you know, if someone is not well
informed, they don't have the awareness for something, they don’t value it. So when you—you do
work. You tell them the benefits of them supporting that member to take that medicine [and
then] it comes easier for them to support them.”) (Participant F speaking) (transcript on file with
authors).
Id. (“[R]emember, when you’re not psychologically okay it affects you in a lot of ways.
Relationships within your family, your household. With the community . . . Because if you’re not
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importance of this multilevel perspective is particularly pronounced in light of
the heavy stigmas associated with past experiences of forced abduction or sexual
violence, as well as stigmas around mental illness or physical disabilities.85 These
dynamics present enormous complications for individual healing and
reintegration into family and community life and must be addressed in order to
see quality of life improvement and, ideally, some forms of healing.
This ecological understanding of the harms suffered during the conflict is
why implementing partners make their initial outreach at the community level,
via the sensitization conversations.86 These conversations are a critical first step
towards future work with individuals as the psychoeducational content serves
the twin goals of helping individuals identify trauma symptoms in themselves
while simultaneously educating other community members about the realities of
the often-stigmatized conflict experiences. The implementing partners see the
necessity—even from this initial interaction—in speaking to both individuals
and the broader community.87 As described more fully in the review of the
indicators of success below, both the TFV and implementing partners see
success at the individual level as necessarily requiring success at other levels of
work. Though this analysis presents the derived indicators divided by level of
intervention, their interdependence should not be underestimated. The same is
true for the discrete indicators within each level of work: success on one indicator
often prompts improvements on others.

C. Indicators of Success in Individuals
Interviewees described a variety of changes they saw in individual
beneficiaries when their programming was working well. As is the case with all

85

better, you can’t take care of yourself, you can’t take care of your family, you can’t live well in the
community.”).
See generally SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES: FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE ERA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (Elizabeth D. Heinemann ed., 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Presidential Statement Condemns Sexual Violence in Conflict, Post-Conflict Situations,
Urges Complete, Immediate Cessation of Such Acts, U.N. Press Release SC/10555 (Feb. 23,
2012), http://perma.cc/Z7UF-X4W8.
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Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“[W]e also do what we call a community dialogue,
community sensitization. We realized that before Trust Fund intervened in the past years, [a]
majority of our beneficiaries were living in stigma . . . So we mobilize community members, some
of our beneficiaries and we talk about the project. We talk about TFV, we introduce TFV, what
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Interview with Participants U & V, in Gulu, Uganda (July 13, 2017) (“Stigmatization is one of the
psychological challenges that people are mentioning. If you follow our client’s files, it is so
rampant. But we also do address it. We do address it at all these levels, we address at the
[community] sensitization level.”) (Participant U speaking) (transcript on file with authors).
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levels of work, these indicators of individual success range from relatively
concrete to somewhat abstract. Interviewees indicated they generally knew their
rehabilitative programming was working well when individual beneficiaries were
able to:
• Connect with others. Many interviewees described beneficiaries as living
in physical or social isolation from others prior to the TFV interventions,
a common reaction to trauma.88 As the assistance mandate programming
took hold, interviewees saw people taking steps to reduce their isolation
and actively seeking to rebuild relationships with relatives and the
broader community.89 Interviewees also noticed a change in how
beneficiaries communicated with NGO staff; for example, making more
eye contact and engaging in conversation willingly. For many
beneficiaries, this increased openness included a new ability to disclose
experiences from the conflict that the beneficiaries had previously been
unable to share with others.90
• Participate in economic activity. Though the current assistance program
does not focus on material assistance, several projects (TPO and
GWED-G) contained positive and sustainable livelihood aspects such as
VSLA. Many interviewees reported that they knew a beneficiary had
made significant improvements when he or she was able to begin
working. More than its economic benefits, work was described as a
dignifying experience. It was also a particularly positive force in
decreasing the experience of stigma; a person’s ability to engage in
productive work defied the stigmatizing narrative and earned the person
respect.91
• Accept themselves and their past experiences. Self-acceptance was an
important indicator of success because the prevalent stigmatization of
88

89

90

91

See Jill Stauffer, Introduction, in ETHICAL LONELINESS: THE INJUSTICE OF NOT BEING HEARD 1
(2018) (discussing the problem of ethical loneliness, “the isolation one feels when one, as a
violated person or as one member of a persecuted group, has been abandoned by humanity, or by
those who have power over one’s life’s possibilities.”).
Interview with Participant J, in Gulu, Uganda (June 30, 2017) (“So that’s the change we see.
Someone who we saw miserably there, almost not liking to see people. You bring him here, you
go back and find him laughing, chatting with the colleagues.”) (transcript on file with authors).
Interview with Participant I, in Gulu, Uganda (June 29, 2017) (“And I have had clients who—I
will never forget it, had just a terrible rape story and she’s crying, crying, crying, and in the end she
says ‘I have never in twenty-four years told anyone this. No one knows this. Twenty-four years!
Not her parents, not her husband, not her family, not her friends. No one.”) (transcript on file
with authors).
Interview with Participant J, supra note 89 (“And now [he] starts something small which earns him
money. He’s a changed person . . . That’s where the community will accept, say ‘Oh, this man or
this woman has value.’”).
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those with mental illness, disabilities, or abduction histories often
includes significant internalized stigmatization.92 As beneficiaries learned
more about mental illness or the involuntariness of the abductions, for
example, they were increasingly able to accept themselves and their past
experiences. This change helped beneficiaries stop blaming themselves
for the harms they experienced and increased their willingness to accept
the services offered by the assistance mandate.93 In many cases, this new
self-acceptance helped beneficiaries take on more leadership roles or
speak publicly about what they experienced.94
Feel a restored sense of hope. One significant indicator of successful
programming was a renewed belief among beneficiaries that there were
still things worth living for and a lessening of the general sense of
hopelessness lingering since the conflict.95 Interviewees routinely
described how people who had previously seemed “stuck” in the past
began to plan for the future. This reemergence of hopefulness was also
expressed as a growing belief that something could be done to alleviate
the physical and psychological pain with which they had been living—
that there was a possibility of improving and it was worth a try.96
Increase their use of healthy coping mechanisms. The success of the
assistance mandate is also evidenced by a change in how beneficiaries
handled stressful situations. Many interviewees pointed to people’s
ability and willingness to use skills in self-regulation (for example,
breathing exercises) that they learned in CBT groups. Beneficiaries
reported that they were able to stay calm in emotionally charged

92

Interview with Participant R, in Gulu, Uganda (July 10, 2017) (“In the beginning . . . the person he
might first of all stigmatize himself.”) (transcript on file with authors); Interview with Participant
K, supra note 82 (“More especially the fact that the persons, our beneficiaries were not just born
with this disability. You know? You are not born with disability. And they—themselves, is not
very easy to accept that ‘Now, I am the way I am.’”).

93

Interview with Participants U & V, supra note 87 (“After sharing with them, [you can see] their
eyes. They can begin to imagine: ‘Oh, I was not—I never intended—I was forced to do it—I was
abducted.’ So after that they will come to have self-confidence that ‘[i]t was not my fault.’”)
(transcript on file with authors).

94

Interview with Participant B, in The Hague, Netherlands (June 23, 2017) (“You have these big
community meetings under the mango tree and everything. These people come forward and talk
about themselves. They would never do that if they were still in that position of being a victim,
being stigmatized, everything. They would never do that.”) (transcript on file with authors).

95

Interview with Participant S, in Gulu, Uganda (July 10, 2017) (“We had war. People just
completely lost hope, completely. What I look at as something very important, as value: people’s
hope is coming back gradually.”) (transcript on file with authors).
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“They’re not alone and [they] see ‘okay, this is
something that I’m having, it’s not that I’m crazy, but this is something and there’s a solution for
it.’”).

96
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situations and were able to use dialogue to resolve conflicts and difficulty
rather than violence.97
Experience fewer/lesser symptoms of mental illness. In addition to the
indicators described above, interviewees felt that reduced symptoms of
mental illness—primarily symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
and major depressive disorder—was a key indicator of success. For
example, many interviewees observed improvements in personal
hygiene, mental clarity, and focus among beneficiaries.98 They noted
decreases in the incidence of suicidal thoughts, nightmares, and somatic
symptoms. Many noticed a reduction in substance abuse, which in most
cases was considered a response to unresolved war trauma.
Improve their physical health. For those implementing partners
providing physical rehabilitation, a key indicator of success in program
delivery was improvements in physical health. Interviewees noted a
range of improvements, from increased mobility after the receipt of a
prosthetic limb to reduced pain from bullet-removal surgeries. In most
cases, these positive indicators led to an overall increase in a person’s
day-to-day functionality and often a corresponding improvement in
mental health.

D. Indicators of Success in Families
As presented by the interviewees, the following were common themes that
emerged from the interviews in response to the question: what does it look like
when rehabilitative programming is working well for families? Interviewees
indicated they generally knew their rehabilitative programming was working well
when they observed:
• Decreased stigma within families. Prior to the interventions of the
assistance mandate, the stigmas associated with sexual violence,
previous experiences of abduction, and/or mental illness were a
significant source of family tensions for many beneficiaries.99 One
97

Interview with Participant H, in Gulu, Uganda (June 29, 2017) (“They have been able to know
how to cope up with, like: ‘[When] I’m called an LRA, I know how to handle such, I know how
to take it.’”) (transcript on file with authors).

98

Interview with Participants X & Y, in Gulu, Uganda (July 13, 2017) (“[At the start] they are so
controlled and they are not able to—they are not able to relax . . . So afterwards you find that they
are able to shift, to be flexible, to move. And even the skin has changed, the hygiene.”)
(Participant Y speaking) (transcript on file with authors).

99

Stigma for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence remains an (often) insurmountable
obstacle to reintegration and rehabilitation. See generally Jocelyn Kelly et. al., Rejection, Acceptance and
the Spectrum Between: Understanding Male Attitudes and Experiences Towards Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 17 BNC WOMEN’S HEALTH 1 (2017).
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indicator of success for families was reduced stigma between family
members and an understanding that, notwithstanding the beneficiary’s
experiences, he or she was still part of the family. In some cases, this
decreased stigmatization was evidenced by family members who had
previously been unwilling to provide at-home care to beneficiaries
becoming more accountable for the well-being of their relatives. Others
reported seeing the family return to treating the beneficiary as they
would other family members.100
Improved family relationships. Many interviewees described general
improvements in the relationships among family members, including an
increase in the use of conversations or family meetings to resolve
conflicts instead of fighting.101 In some cases, interviewees observed
beneficiaries directly teaching their relatives the coping skills learned in
CBT that the beneficiaries had found especially useful.102 These
improvements were particularly evident in parent-child dynamics. As the
parent-beneficiary improved his or her individual well-being he or she
enjoyed increased parenting capacity and stronger relationships with his
or her children.103
Reconciliation of spouses. One indicator of successful programming
was the desire of previously separated spouses to reconcile.104 Multiple
interviewees described how many husbands or wives had left their
spouses when the demands of caring for them became too great or
when they felt they could no longer maintain a relationship with them.
Interviewees felt the impact of the assistance mandate programming on
family relationships was evident where these spouses indicated a desire
to reconcile after seeing changes in their former partners.105 We

Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“A lot of our principles we employ . . . even in the
families, we reinforce that this child should be taken care of just like any other person in this
family. You don’t even want to overprotect . . . Normally. Treat normally.”).
Interview with Participant Y, supra note 98 (“Some of them go and they come and tell us: ‘I had
an issue with my son, I sat him down and talked to him—and this is what I never used to do.’
[Or] ‘I was able to contain this argument and not fight and this is what would never happen.’”).
Id. (“With the information, the knowledge, and the skills that they have got through the therapy,
they’re able to give it out to other people, [saying] ‘We went and did the exercises with our
children, and they were so excited.’”).
Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“You find that their impact is coming even to the
children. The children are living happily, they are all going to school. They are having, enjoying
family.”).

104

Id. (“As I talk now, all of their women have come back because [their men] are now doing well—
they’ve got treatment and their life is going on.”).

105

Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“In her new home, people have accepted now what
happened. The challenge she’s having is that her former husband wants her back with the

516

Vol. 19 No. 2

Between Reparations and Repair

•

Dutton & Ní Aoláin

acknowledge that longer-term assessment would be needed to qualify
the substance and durability of such reconciliations and the reduction of
sexual and gender-based violence over the long haul, given the
pernicious effects of trauma on relationship stability and family life over
a lifetime.
Increase in economic power. Interviewees noted the improved
economic power of families as one indicator of success at the family
level, which was usually the result of a beneficiary being able to return
to work.106 In addition to the pragmatic benefits of higher incomes,
greater economic power was seen as improving family relations as the
additional income reduced stress and increased respect for the
contributing family members.107 Increased economic power also helped
the family provide their children educational opportunities, a point of
pride and a demonstration of a functional family unit that was one of
the most commonly noted indicators of success among interviewees.

E. Indicators of Succe ss in Communities
As presented by the interviewees, the following were common themes that
emerged from the responses to the question: what does it look like when
rehabilitative programming is working well for communities? Interviewees
indicated they generally knew their rehabilitative programming was working well
when they observed:
• A culture of togetherness: One key indicator of community-level
improvement was a change in the overall culture of the community.
Specifically, interviewees described how they saw community
sensitization and group dialogues carried out as part of the assistance
mandate transform the practices and mindset of the community by
promoting reconciliation and togetherness rather than conflict and
division.108 The lessening of stigmas and the reacceptance of beneficiaries
were important elements of this change. Community members began

106

children. So, we have had this where the husband comes and tells us that ‘What you people did
with my wife, I’m so grateful, but if you could also help me get her back.’”).
Interview with Participant Q, in Gulu, Uganda (July 10, 2017) (“[The] individual, when somebody
is treated, he gains his ability to do the normal work and the income is raised and it—the family
becomes happy, so there is union, family unity.”) (transcript on file with authors).

107

Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“Because [before] you can’t even participate in
economic activity. And in a way, humanly, your husband may look at you as if you are lazy.”).

108

Interview with Participant D, in Gulu, Uganda (June 28, 2017) (“One thing was first to change the
attitude of the community. So instead of going for violence, say ‘Let us calm down, see other
aspects of development, and maintain humanity.’ That was quite hard.”) (transcript on file with
authors).
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perceiving beneficiaries as part of their community, rather than as
dangerous or worthless people who should be kept separate.109 In
another context, interviewees observed community members turning to
dialogue grounded in mutual respect to resolve current land conflicts.110
Supportive communities: In addition to changes in the general culture,
interviewees also described examples of community members helping
each other out as evidence of success.111 Often building off of the
therapy groups or VSLA networks cultivated as part of the assistance
mandate, interviewees saw people taking care of each other and reaching
out to support their neighbors with both economic and emotional
support.112

F. Indicators of Success in Implementing Partners
Though this was not a specific question asked of interviewees, many
described indicators of success related to the leadership and capacity of the
implementing partners themselves. As described in the following indicators, a
successful assistance mandate thus strengthens the capacity of local
organizations to provide long-term leadership and services in their communities.
In fragmented post-conflict societies, where governance capacity is often limited,
this form of capacity building supports and enables civil society—an important
dimension of conflict prevention in the short, medium, and long-term.113

109

Id. (“Yes, the community must accept: that one is still a part of them.”); Interview with Participant
B, supra note 94 (“[I]n these types of crimes which are mass crimes, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, there’s always individual harm you can’t escape that, but the harm transcends also the
individual level. It really affects—and that’s often the purpose of these crimes—to break down
family, to break down communities, to really destroy the enemy in this way also.”).

110

Interview with Participant S, supra note 95 (“You cannot conflict over land when you’re in the
same group.”).

111

Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“They are now joining hands together to support one
another. And I’m happy that they’re not only supporting the members in the group, they’re even
supporting the needy people which are not there within the group.”).
Interview with Participant O, in Gulu, Uganda (July 10, 2017) (“Right now when we receive
phone calls from our [community] network it’s that: ‘Somebody’s been raped but we reported the
case to police and we have also made sure they are following up with the survivor.’ It’s different
than when there were people in front of our gate [and] they came [to us] because somebody is
raped.”) (transcript on file with authors); Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“[O]ne of
the CBT groups—they’re like: ‘We identified some members and they have been getting
medication, we have been basing on the knowledge and the counseling we have gotten from you
people, through the CBT session, we have started also meeting them on a weekly basis. And also
trying to deliver this information and the knowledge that you people guided us.’”).

112

113

Hugh Miall, Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task, BERGHOF RESEARCH CENTER
CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Aug. 2004), http://perma.cc/M8XK-NREK.

518

FOR

Vol. 19 No. 2

Between Reparations and Repair

•

•

Dutton & Ní Aoláin

Implementing partners seen as trusted leaders: Interviewees described a
variety of ways the implementing partners have taken on leadership roles
in the region, speaking to the credibility of the organizations and the
efficacy of their programming. For example, other nonprofits routinely
reach out to the implementing partners when they need help mobilizing
people for their own programming.114 CVT holds a unique role as an
implementing partner that explicitly focuses on capacity-building, but
other implementing partners reported that they were also asked to
provide trainings to other NGOs and government entities. Relatedly,
individual beneficiaries often approach implementing partners for
referrals to organizations that meet needs which fall outside the scope of
the assistance mandate, demonstrating the trust built between
implementing partners and local communities.115
Increasing professionalization of implementing partners: Through
partnership with the TFV, some implementing partners reported
increased capabilities in evaluation, financial auditing, and organizational
skills.116 This professionalization of implementing partners is critical for
providing services sustainably, not only because it strengthens civil
society, but also because it ensures the effective use of resources.117

G. Indicators of Success in Government
As with the indicators relating to implementing partners, this was not a
specific question asked of interviewees. However, the importance of
government empowerment and accountability emerged as a common theme in
the responses regarding requirements for the sustainable success of the

114

115

116

117

Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“When some people now want to meet, meet the
members in the field, they will ask you: ‘When is TPO organizing something?’ Because they know
[with] TPO, you’ll get the community.”).
Interview with Participant R, supra note 92 (“You become more of a point of reference and you
find that people feel your presence. And if you are sometimes not there they will say—like, today
if I was here, you will see people [elsewhere] calling saying ‘Tomorrow, we need to come for
referral.’”).
Interview with Participant B, supra note 94 (“It’s the same with these smaller organizations, we
invest in these small organizations which really hinge on the energy and drive of certain
individuals. But if they don’t evolve into organizations that actually can carry that as an
organization, rather than just to be driven by the energy [it will not work for the assistance
mandate].”).
Id. (“Now to go from one-year contracts, but to have multiyear contracts and partnerships that
last beyond, some lasted even seven years . . . They evolve with us and we are building their
capacity also to do things that they never were able to do so before so that was, I think, a very
important element of what we are doing in the assistance mandate.”).
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assistance mandate.118 Long-term programmatic success depends on the ability
of the Ugandan government to provide funding or services similar to those
currently provided by the TFV.119 As such, a successful assistance mandate
fosters accountability and builds capacity in the government during its
operation—rather than allowing its presence to displace the government’s sense
of responsibility to its citizens.120 We acknowledge that this is a complex line to
draw, not least because the assessment of governmental capacity is deeply
contested and displacement itself is hard to measure given the high level of
governmental paralysis, corruption, and ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, the main
takeaway from this indicator is the importance of implementing partners being
aware of the problems of displacement and proceeding with caution to prevent
the abdication of state responsibilities.

IV. S TRENGTHS OF THE A SSISTANCE M ANDATE
In addition to questions regarding the indicators of a successful assistance
mandate, interviewees were asked questions about the strengths and challenges
of the current assistance mandate program. The strengths described below were
identified most often as key elements contributing to the overall success of the
assistance mandate. Given the distinct roles of the TFV and the implementing
partners, this Section will divide the responses into two sections: strengths
related to the Trust Fund and strengths related to the implementing partners.
However, the partnership model of the assistance mandate means that the

118

119

120

Interview with Participant P, in Gulu, Uganda (July 10, 2017) (“We keep also bringing in the
aspect that the government is responsible to provide services for war victims.”) (transcript on file
with authors).
Interview with Participant B, supra note 94. (“[W]e will never be able as a fund to reach all of
these victims, but we do have a responsibility of advocacy and to advocate with the government.
Not necessarily to have reparations programs, but really to strengthen your line ministries. Your
ministry of health, your ministry of education, to have them build the capacity to address these
issues in the long term.”).
Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“Then our other role is to explain to the local
authorities what the project is doing so that they also understand. Because we are complementing
the effort of the local government. Therefore, they play a big role, and we also play a big role. We
want the project to be owned by them so we must also support and help them.”); Interview with
Participant O, supra note 112 (“[W]e want to ensure that people are able to direct what they really
want and sustain, scale up, you know, and begin to make demands for government to fix the gaps
in programming. And that's why last time when the ICC President came and we went to the field
together with the TFV Board, the beneficiaries talked so strongly and they said ‘See what the ICC
is giving us.’ There's a guy who got up and said: ‘They spend over 30 million shillings on my hip
relocation but I asked myself what if TFV is not there? This is supposed to be given by
government.’ And then to the government officials that were there, the beneficiary got up and
said: ‘What have you done so far in this program?’”).
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strengths of the implementing partners routinely inform the strengths of the
Trust Fund and vice versa.

A. Strengths Related to the Trust Fund
1. The design and unique services of the TFV’s program as well as
the TFV’s long-term presence in Northern Uganda contribute to
its success as a reparative program.
The core strength of the Trust Fund’s assistance mandate work in
Northern Uganda is the unique and effective design of its program. That design
involves an iterative process of engagement by TFV staff with local interlocutors
to better respond to the needs and challenges of the local people.121 The TFV
stressed the capacity of its design and implementation to evolve and be
responsive to local challenges, needs, and experiences. Interviewees from both
the TFV and the implementing partners agree that the assistance mandate fills a
major gap by providing services that would not otherwise exist in the region.122
With respect to timing, the assistance mandate funding entered the region
at the close of the conflict before significant development work began and when
the vast majority of international aid agencies were starting to leave.123 Thus, the
assistance mandate occupied a unique space between humanitarian/emergency
response organizations and development agencies. The implementing partners
noted the importance of the timely entry of the assistance mandate funding as
the departure of other donors had many worried that they would have to cease
their operations. While this finding is specific to Northern Uganda, the pattern
of agency departure is similar across post-conflict transition sites, affirming the
potential importance of the Trust Fund’s intermediate role in multiple sites.
Relatedly, the Trust Fund’s relatively long-term presence in the region has
contributed greatly to its success because the length of time required to build
relationships with communities is necessary to deliver truly rehabilitative
programming.
121

Interview with Participant M, in Kampala, Uganda (July 5, 2017) (“The desk review [of a planned
assistance mandate] has to be substantiated by firsthand information, so this is where the field
mission/assessment . . . takes place . . . We come up with a mission plan, we try to develop local
contacts . . . meetings take place with government, with local NGOs, with victims’ associations,
victim’s groups, with anybody who has been involved.”) (transcript on file with authors).

122

Interview with Participant T in Gulu, Uganda (July 11, 2017) (describing the TFV focus on
holistic mental health programming as unique in Uganda) (notes on file with authors); Interview
with Participant N, in Kampala, Uganda (July 7, 2017) (notes on file with authors).
Interview with Participant J, supra note 89 (“By the time TFV came to give us support, other
donor friends, they had left because the war had ended. So when the war ended, there were little
resources to run the workshop. It was almost on the verge of collapsing.”).

123
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The success of the assistance mandate also relies on the unique services it
provides. The assistance mandate is rehabilitative in nature and operates from a
perspective of remedying a harm rather than addressing a need.124 This
foundational difference ensures that services focus on addressing the root causes
of the suffering experienced by beneficiaries. Implementing partners described
this focus as significantly more effective than the focus of other needs-based
programs.125 For example, one interviewee described the limitations of previous
funding which focused on improving school attendance rates for children but
did not address any of the underlying harms causing the absenteeism. When the
assistance mandate arrived, the implementing partners were able to focus on
remedying the physical and psychological effects of the conflict which they
viewed as the “real” problem.126 Indeed, the assistance mandate’s implementing
partners are still among the very few organizations in the region that offer this
kind of conflict-focused rehabilitative service.127
The importance of a focus on remedying harms was also emphasized by
many other interviewees, who described the pointlessness of providing aid or
job training without first addressing the lingering impact of the conflict.128
Overall, the interviewees agreed that the assistance mandate is delivering the
right services at the right time and is an effective reparative program.

124

Telephone Interview with Participant M (July 20, 2017) (“But in asking questions, we do not
approach the question from the perspective of the need, but of the harm. We are not asking ‘What
are your needs?’ We are looking at their harm. And this already allows you to place a conversation
. . . in a different perspective. I'm not looking at what you need. I'm looking at what you suffered.
And based on what you suffered, we can build up a program.”) (transcript on file with authors).

125

Interview with Participant B, supra note 94 (“[T]he assistance mandate, even if it’s not
reparations—judicial reparations—per se, it does have a reparative purpose . . . it really fits within
the Rome Statute but it sets us apart also [from] more generic humanitarian and development aid,
post-conflict development that you might see.”).

126

Interview with Participants E, F, & G, supra note 83 (Participant G speaking).
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“[O]ne thing that I think is important to note is that
TFV is also one—I don't want to say only, because I don't know all the donors—but one of the
fewer donors that actually provides money in really just this. Because they are really focused on
rehabilitation in a psychological sense and I think that's very good. And it's always difficult to get
it together: what donors can offer and what on the ground is needed. There always needs to be
restrictions which is extremely hard . . . TFV is a very remarkable donor. It's a very good fund.”).
Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“[If] you haven’t sorted out my mental problem and
you give me animals to keep—definitely I will slaughter them! But people are taken through CBT,
they [sic] know ‘This is our group’s thing, it helps us. This is how we should live.’ The person has
been healed psychologically, the person has been healed mentally. Now they have this approach,
knowing: ‘This is what I should do.’”).

127

128
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2. The collaborative nature of the Trust Fund allows it to evolve and
expand its operations.
The collaborative nature of the Trust Fund’s operational engagement is a
foundational strength for the assistance mandate. From the beginning of the
assistance mandate program, the Trust Fund has relied on the knowledge and
the input from affected communities in designing its program, resulting in the
strong design of the Uganda assistance mandate.129 That collaborative and
participatory approach is a model of best practice, one to be emulated in other
instances of national level implementation of reparations and support to victim
survivors. The design was also aided by the broad scope of the assistance
mandate, which allows the Trust Fund significantly more latitude than, for
example, designing mechanisms for reparations programs which must be
responsive to particular convictions.130
Due to its collaborative nature, the Trust Fund has been able to make
improvements and course corrections as needed over the years based on
feedback from the implementing partners.131 The Trust Fund was also
collaborative in its approach to the TFV monitoring and evaluation program.
For example, in July 2017, the Trust Fund convened a multiday workshop for all
implementing partners in Northern Uganda to request input on the proposed
evaluation monitoring plan and to involve the partners in the development of
the details of the plan.132
129

130

131

132

Interview with Participant N, supra note 122; ICC, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS (TFV)
BACKGROUND SUMMARY (Aug. 2008), http://perma.cc/PY23-4H4A. See also TFV Strategic Plan
2014-2017, supra note 79.
Interview with Participant C, in The Hague, Netherlands (June 23, 2017) (“[The assistance
mandate] allows for a much more broad [sic] intervention, rather than a piecemeal and very
limited intervention . . . I’ll give you Lubanga [reparations] as an example . . . in terms of what the
conflict was about you have all types of ethnic divisions, you have a great deal of societal cohesion
falling apart. But Mr. Lubanga was convicted of recruiting child soldiers. Period. And that means
in terms of peacebuilding exercises, in terms of community reconciliation about the conflict that
he was obviously a part of, that can only occur under the assistance mandate.”) (transcript on file
with authors).
Interview with Participant Z, in Gulu, Uganda (July 13, 2017) (“[E]very time TFV has—Scott,
specifically, been great on believing and supporting. Whatever I was moving, TFV was supporting
. . . they've been very supportive and so much trust in our work. And so that's how we are
continuing developing. Trying to do every time better.”) (transcript on file with authors).
Interview with Participant M, supra note 121 (“[W]e work with victims—with them and for them
and the ‘with them’ I want to stress it because it's not something that's designed in an artificial
setting in the Hague where we think. We do what we must do with this and we invest funds to
bring up the capacity and build the capacity to have these possibilities like you are seeing this
week, for implementing partners to come together to discuss among themselves. This place, also
along the lines of sustainability, we won't be around forever and then these organizations, if they
can benefit from anything from us and then develop their own links among themselves, then it's
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This collaborative mindset has also strengthened the relationships of
implementing partners whose contacts were not necessarily formalized before
the assistance mandate.133 Many interviewees greatly appreciated the professional
support134 and networking opportunities they received from other implementing
partners. In this way, the Trust Fund plays a role in convening a network of
organizations that together made a collective impact in the region.135 While the
scale of this effect requires measuring the development of such relationships,
particularly in a highly fragmented and dysfunctional political context, it
underscores the downstream positive benefits of local-international relationships
that are genuinely committed to dialogue and collective work.
The Trust Fund’s focus on working with partner organizations to
strengthen capacity-building is another example of its collaborative nature.136
The Trust Fund seems to be careful when selecting its implementing partners,
prioritizing (among other factors) the organization’s proven track record of
success in the region, expressly avoiding work with “suitcase” NGOs or those
with insufficient ties to the region.137 Though many implementing partners are

133

134

135

good. Then we'll leave and we'll leave knowing that we've left behind something that can make a
difference.”).
Interview with Participant B, supra note 94 (“So that's the kind of thinking that's going into the
selection. You need to build—you know, these organizations they know each other. It's a small
world. So use that. Use that and not have them siloed in contracts but use the capability.”).
Examples of professional support included shared trainings or supervision sessions. Interview
with Participant I, supra note 90 (“CVT is actually, of course, also mental health so we work
closely with them. Our social workers are actually right now getting a training from their staff.”).
Interview with Participant B, supra note 94 (“You’re using all kinds of qualities [among the
implementing partners] that are complementary that really—you have a network of which the
outcome is bigger than the components you have inside.”).

136

Telephone Interview with Participant M, supra note 124 (“During the workshop in Kampala they
mentioned, I don't remember who, but they said ‘You know, most of these agencies whether it's
the UN or big international organizations that give money, they fund organizations, they're not
interested in doing that much of in-depth work with implementing partners.’ They have money,
they need somebody on the ground to implement some projects. They sign a contract, they give
it, they perform a little evaluation afterwards and that's it.”).

137

Id. (“[The Trust Fund] work[s] with implementing partners that are based—if they are not local,
like originally from the country, they must have been based there for a number of years that
allows them to have knowledge of the situation where they work and this criteria has always been
there.”); Interview with Participant N, supra note 122; see also Prosecutor v Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-3177, Annex A: Trust Fund for Victims Draft Implementation Plan for
Collective Reparations to Victims (Mar. 3, 2015); See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-3273, Annex A: (Draft) SCOPE OF WORK Collective Reparations Projects in
Relation to the Conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Before the International Criminal Court,
20–21 (Feb. 13, 2017) (describing the three documents that potential applicant organizations in
the DRC must provide in response to an RFP: 1. NGO registration in the country, 2. At least two
years of work and two projects showing relevant work experience in the country, and 3. A recent
audit report of the organization).
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already highly professional organizations, the Trust Fund is willing to help
smaller, community-based organizations to further build their operations.138
Ensuring the Trust Fund is collaborating with professional organizations capable
of, for example, passing audits and meeting grant reporting requirements is
important for the Trust Fund’s own accountability and it is also relevant to the
longevity of the implementing partners. The neglect of the northern region of
Uganda by the national government means any available funding in the shortterm is likely to come from international sources (and that connection to
international sources remains precarious and subject to a multitude of external
factors). When the Trust Fund helps implementing partners improve their
organizational capacity, it also expands their capacity to seek out other grants
and thus to ensure their survival when the assistance mandate comes to a close.
For example, a current implementing partner—Gulu Women’s Economic
Development and Globalization (GWED-G)—began its relationship as a
subgrantee of a different implementing partner. As its organizational capacity
improved, GWED-G was eventually able to apply for assistance mandate
funding in its own right; it has since become a large nonprofit that has
successfully attracted several international donations and expanded its services.139

B. Strengths Related to the Implementing Partners
1. The basis of the implementing partners’ strengths is the trust they
establish with the community.
Without exception, the implementing partners all stated that they
prioritized building trust with the communities in which they worked and saw
this as a fundamental prerequisite to successfully carrying out their program. 140
138

Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“[The TFV-funded project] saw us doing the work
very well, they gave us the trainings in every aspect. Resource mobilization, resource management,
financial accountability, leadership, all of it. They really built our capacity . . . We started with a
small amount and every year it doubled. So from three subcounties, we are now in 18
subcounties, which means we are in four districts.”).

139

Interview with Participant O, supra note 112 (“[W]e started partnering with [a different nonprofit],
to implement the TFV projects because we had registered a huge number of people who needed
corrective surgery, psychosocial redress, they needed some activity that promotes a peaceful
coexistence, environment in their own community. So after doing [that] project for some time we
realized our potential working with war victims. Then when TFV advertised we decided ‘let's go
alone.’ So that's how now we are direct partner.”).

140

Interview with Participants E, F, & G, supra note 83 (“Working with [volunteers in the villages]
makes it easier for you to enter into a certain community. Because when you go to a community
for the first time, they don’t know you. And the first thing will be that they will first resist.
Remember, mental health generally is a taboo in African traditional society. People don’t like
being open about mental illness. But working with the [volunteers] . . . it becomes a bit easier for
us to reach the communities.”) (Participant F speaking).
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Building this trust is critically important in the context of Northern Uganda
because of the widespread skepticism toward the primary services offered by the
implementing partners: therapy and surgery. This skepticism is compounded by
the deep stigma and shame surrounding issues of mental health, disability, sexual
violence, and abduction during the conflict.141 Additionally, interviewees
mentioned that many people formed bad impressions of NGOs during the years
of conflict and immediately afterwards;142 the general belief was that NGOs
made many promises but never delivered results.143 NGO fatigue is a consistent
feature of many post-conflict environments, compounding the challenges of
post-conflict reconstruction in fragile, insecure, and economically devastated
countries. For all these reasons, building trust with potential beneficiaries is a
crucial first step toward program delivery. Additionally, it serves as a means to
restore broader civil society capacity and maintain the possibility of more
broadly-based reconstruction in partnership with local communities. Without
trust, many people would not be willing to come forward and request services.144
Interviewees described four key factors that have helped them establish
this trust. First, the vast majority of the implementing partners’ staff are
themselves Ugandans from the northern region.145 The shared cultural
background and language is highly valuable, and interviewees routinely noted
that it gave them an inherent level of credibility and trust with the

141

Interview with Participant D, supra note 108 (“Some of them after they lose a limb, they don't
want to come to GROW because they'll be exposed when they do the assessment. Some of them
are saying ‘Why are you asking all of this, where I come from—why all of this?’”).

142

See generally SÉVERINE AUTESSERRE, PEACELAND: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE EVERYDAY
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS (2016) (discussing the impact that the practices of
individual organization members can have on the effectiveness of reparative work).
Interview with Participant R, supra note 92 (“[There were] the interventions that many others have
been promising: ‘We shall work on you, victim.’ They say ‘Ah, just like those ones who have been
talking to us but they failed, maybe you will also go for us and fail.’”).

143

144

Interview with Participant V, supra note 87 (“Those who are more affected and those who are
really perpetrators, they cannot easily trust. They have that doubt that ‘Are they going to use
maybe this to either arrest me or to get more information about me?’ Because they know very
much about ICC and the rest . . . they cannot easily open up freely. At least after building more
trust then they can open up.”); Interview with Participant U, supra note 87 (“And the origin of this
being a bit skeptical from the clients who are perpetrators is about the brainwashing that has
taken place during captivity. You find such a person might have been in captivity for two years.
And there the commanders and the LRA were brainwashing them of ‘Don't trust anyone, you go
back home, even if you go back home they'll just deceive you for a while and then they arrest you,
they kill you, all those.’”).

145

Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“[I]f people see their son and daughter working,
doing the work, then they feel ‘This is, this son is telling me the truth.’”).
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beneficiaries.146 A key element of this approach is to avoid the insidious
manifestation of neo-colonial power-relationships in humanitarian intervention
settings. Moreover, there is increasing recognition that the wholesale importation
of western therapeutic models to non-western post-conflict settings without
awareness of adaptation to cultural variations is both insensitive and ill-fitting to
the trauma and needs of local populations. Bespoke local interventions,
spearheaded by locally trained experts is not only ethically and culturally
appropriate but more likely to deliver sustained individual and community
recovery in the long run.
In the context of the programming described here, the shared cultural
background was particularly helpful when introducing new concepts like group
therapy to the community. When possible, the staff participated in the daily lives
of the communities in which they worked, for example attending funerals or
spending time in the market to further develop rapport and trust with
community members. Additionally, the implementing partners always
collaborated with local leaders to facilitate their entry into the communities.147
Second, the results of the assistance mandate program are visible, which is
particularly helpful in differentiating the TFV-funded projects from those of
past NGOs.148 As described in the preceding Section, many of the indicators of
success in individuals are changes easily noticed by other members of the
community: a renewed ability to participate in community life, an end to
isolation, better hygiene and social skills, and new engagement in economic
activity. These visible results lent credibility to the implementing partners’
assertions that surgery and therapy worked, while distinguishing the assistance
mandate from other programs where the results were never felt in the
community.149
Third, the long-term presence of the implementing partners and the
assistance mandate project in the region was universally mentioned as a valuable
factor in building community trust. This was particularly true as the visible
146

147

148

149

Interview with Participant V, supra note 87 (“[W]hat motivates them so much for them to trust
[us]—we model to them the experience that we underwent. So when ‘These people, they also
experienced the same traumatic experience that we had. So we are now the same.’ So they can
begin to open up easily.”).
Interview with Participant Y, supra note 98 (“Actually, we begin by informing—like I said, we get
a contact person or a facilitator or a community leader to inform the members.”).
Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“I don't remember which district but there was a
leader that commented: ‘AVSI, for us, we know how you do your work. You are not just people
whose results of work is not seen. It is seen. Not like this where [they] say: “We are doing this,
this, this, this—and you don't see.””).
Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“You know why I like this project? Because it talks
by itself. The result can be seen. Somebody has been in this condition. Now, from that condition,
he is now like this. So there's no doubt about it.”).
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changes of the first beneficiaries to complete the programming often encouraged
previously hesitant members of the community to reach out for services
themselves. The fact that the implementing partners did not depart from the
region after conducting one cycle of therapy groups was critical in helping the
Trust Fund reach some of the more reluctant—and often the most seriously
affected—members of the community while demonstrating its genuine
commitment to the region. Furthermore, the long-term investment allowed the
development of sufficient trust to enable people to speak about particularly
stigmatized topics. For example, one interviewee described how it took nearly
two full years of outreach and sensitization work for people to begin coming
forward for services related to sexual violence.150
Finally, interviewees highlighted the importance of managing the
community’s expectations when recruiting and explaining their program. This
was particularly important when explaining the seemingly arbitrary eligibility
criteria imposed by the Rome Statute. Because the Rome Statute took effect on
July 1, 2002, the Court’s jurisdiction (and thus the Trust Fund’s programming)
only covers harms occurring after that date, while the conflict in Northern
Uganda began in the late 1980s. Moreover, differentiating the Trust Fund’s work
from that of the ICC was necessary for the Trust Fund to build relationships
and establish its own bona fides with local communities as many expressed
dissatisfaction with the pace and substance of international criminal justice. 151
Similarly, staff are very direct about the lack of financial assistance provided,
emphasizing from the beginning that the only services the people will receive are
physical and psychological services.152 This honesty and transparency help avoid
misunderstandings while building trust.

2. The effective outreach strategies of the implementing partners help
build credibility with communities.
Effective outreach is critical to ensuring that the assistance mandate
programming reaches the people it intends to serve. However, outreach is
150

151

152

Interview with Participant P, supra note 118 (“It takes a while! In year one—because we have just
started now the third year of implementation—in year one, it wasn’t easy. To the extent that we
even sat and said ‘Are these people there or not?’ [Now] we have a list of those who have now
come up and registered with the subcounty based facilitator . . . and it is because of the intensive
sensitization.”).
Interview with Participant N, supra note 122; Interview with Participant V, supra note 87
(“[Beneficiaries who were perpetrators] know very much about the ICC . . . so they fear, ‘Could
be that I was given letter of amnesty, are they going—I mean, are they trying maybe to bring us so
they arrest me because of what I have been doing?’ So they have that fear.”).
Interview with Participant Z, supra note 131 (“[Y]ou have to learn to say to the client, ‘I can see
that you need for the school fees for your child, it's so important, so difficult for you. But I have
to tell you, that at the end of our sessions, still you will be as poor economically as we started.’”).
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complicated by the stigma and general skepticism of the services offered as well
as the challenges posed by the restrictive eligibility criteria of the Rome Statute.
In response, the implementing partners have learned to use a variety of strategies
to effectively spread the word about their work. Many of these strategies,
described below, serve to build credibility via partnerships with local leaders and
mitigate the “outsider” status of the implementing partners.
• Collaboration with previous beneficiaries: The most effective messengers
in sharing information about the programming were often previous
beneficiaries who had positive experiences with the assistance mandate.
In many instances, this word of mouth recruiting happened
spontaneously, unprompted by the implementing partners.153 This
collaboration was particularly helpful in dispelling some of the
skepticism and stigma regarding the programs offered.154
• Coordination with local government: All implementing partners
prioritized building relationships with local government leaders, relying
on them to convey their messages. In particular, implementing partners
often partnered with leaders at the Local Council 1 (“LC1”) level, a
highly local level of the government. The LC1s are expected to have
relationships with all their constituents and thus could provide insights
about potential beneficiaries and pre-existing relationships that were
critical in mobilizing people to attend outreach sessions.155 Strong
relationships with local governments were also important to prevent any
suspicion or problems with the implementing partners’ presence in the
villages.156 We suspect that such “political” cultivation may come with its
153

154

155

156

Interview with Participant U, supra note 87 (“[A]nother link that is helping us that I've observed is
other clients that we have been with them in the past do go and share about us to other
community members . . . Then they come back and say ‘Wow, I shared with the people in suchand-such a parish and they are really interested and they are in need.’ So we go there.”).
Interview with Participant W, in Gulu, Uganda (July 13, 2017) (“[T]he clients that participated in
the previous cycle mobilized people to participate now in our activities. And generally the reason
that they give as the point for coming is they see the change in their friend or relative or
somebody told them that when they received the service their life changed. So they've come to
see if their life can as well change.”) (transcript on file with authors).
Interview with Participant P, supra note 118 (“We have the facilitator who is based at the
subcounty. But now, as I was saying, if this is the subcounty with four parishes, every parish has
four villages, and every village has the LC1. So you find if we are coming to a specific village the
SCBF still links up with the LC1 because the LC1 of the village knows his people very well.
Household by household. So they help us a lot in the mobilization of these community members.
But we are also very, very careful in dealing with them because we know some of them can, they
can influence the system.”).
Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“What we do in every project that GWED-G gets,
GWED-G signs MOU with the local government at district level. By doing so, you are creating a
relationship where the leaders feel that you don't leave them out. They feel that they are very
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own complexities and compromises and surmise that further study
would reveal the extent to which it poses substantial challenges to the
integrity of the implementing partners’ work.
Partnership with local staff and volunteers: The pragmatic challenges of
distance, travel time, and limited staff capacity make it difficult for the
implementing partners to develop and maintain relationships in all of the
regions in which they work. In response, many of the implementing
partners have developed networks of local volunteers to assist with
outreach and mobilization.157 These local contacts also serve as
important sources of knowledge about the people in the community
who might benefit from the assistance mandate and continue the
sensitization work while the Gulu-based staff are away.158
Clear management of expectations: In addition to cultivating
relationships with those in the community, managing expectations about
eligibility for the assistance mandate and the kinds of services offered
was critical for effective outreach.159 This focus on realism and

important. And they are owners of the programs that operate in their district. Our entry point is
the local leaders, briefing them and accepting us because if you don't do it, you become their
enemy number 1: ‘Why are you doing it in secret?’”).
157

Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“[T]hose people are eager to work with us because
they see the benefits within their community. They actually volunteer to work with us . . . [The
volunteers talk] about what TPO is doing, how TPO is supporting the communities, telling
people in case you have such-and-such a problem you can talk to TPO. They are like a linkage
between us and the community.”); Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“And we pick in
different categories [of volunteers] because . . . they also have different areas of operations. Like
religious leaders, they meet people in different places. Sometimes they are called for a wedding,
prayers, funerals, worship, church, and other things. So at the end of those activities they bring in
the activity of TPO.”); Interview with Participant O, supra note 112 (“The other thing is that we
learned to build, put a lot of resources into our community network. Which is at the grassroots
level. In this project it's called ‘community-based facilitator.’ You go to garden where people are
farming in groups [sic] you pick also your hoes and go farm with them. You begin to introduce
yourself ‘I'm a referral actor in case there's a problem in your community you come to me, but
these are the issues, what do you think about this?’”).

158

Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“[O]n several occasions we have identified people for
support based on recommendations from [local volunteers] because they live exactly with—they
live in the same place with these people . . . It is very hard for me to know that this person went
through the war. But the villagers they know this person was abducted, they stayed in the bush for
this period of time, this person within this community always has these kind of challenges . . .
Now basing on referrals after identifying these people, the [local volunteers] with the social
workers form up these groups. Then, again, we go deep into assessing.”).
Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“We even tell them that ‘We are coming for A-B-CD. This is what we are coming for.’ But you know, expectations of the community. You find that
turn-out is really great and then during the dialogue through their questions you'll realize that
you're not meeting their expectations. Someone is saying ‘Yes, me, I thought you were bringing
for us something else, maybe like seeds. I thought you were bringing seeds. You just want to talk?

159
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pragmatism can be very difficult with highly traumatized communities
and individuals whose needs are great and who may view external
entities as having more capacity and resources than they actually do. Yet,
the necessity of this transparency cannot be overstated. It is critical for
ethical honesty and for leveling the playing field between the victim and
the provider. Notably, clearly emphasizing the eligibility criteria from the
beginning—particularly the July 1, 2002, cutoff date—helped
implementing partners focus their outreach on those who would
ultimately be eligible for individual services.

3. The implementing partners’ programs are designed specifically for
the Ugandan context.
Building on the strengths inherent in the design of the assistance mandate
itself, one of the core strengths of the implementing partners’ work is the steps
they have taken to ensure their programs are well-suited for the Ugandan
context.160 This strength has several facets which are described below.
• Long-term commitments: In light of underlying stigma and the general
skepticism of the program, interviewees reported that it usually took a
while for people to feel comfortable coming forward for help.161 Once
people do come forward, the rehabilitative process for individuals,
families, and communities is not a quick process.162 The nature of the
work and the context requires a long-term commitment to the region in
You just want to talk. How can this talking help us? I am hungry. Can this talking give me
food?’”).
160

Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“And of course, I mean, there are flaws. But I think
we've really—in my old organization I wasn't so sure if we actually were making a difference. And
here, I really, I really feel we're doing something.”); Programming Guiding Principles, THE TRUST
FUND FOR VICTIMS, http://perma.cc/D5D6-RXSD; THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, STRATEGIC
PLAN 2014-2017 SUMMARY (2014), http://perma.cc/CPS2-MDKR; Jennifer McCleary-Sills &
Stella Mukasa, External Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Victims Programmes in Northern Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo: Towards a Perspective for Upcoming Interventions, INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN (2013).

161

Interview with Participant D, supra note 108 (“Initially, actually, it was not easy [for people to talk
about the trauma]. It was not easy and, how do you say, we're going for over ten years with it.
Going gradually.”); Interview with Participant U, supra note 87 (“And one thing we always find
with them is that when you go for the first time they tend to think that what we don't provide is
what they want. They want the school fees, they want the seeds, they want these other things. But
now, due to our continuous intervention and interactions, they begin to realize that ‘I think these
people are real’ and are ready for psychotherapy.”).
Interview with Participant W, supra note 154 (“[I]n terms of openness, some cultures do not
recommend very wide openness about private life experiences to a stranger or to somebody you
met two, three times. That is something that you have to consider as you make the assessment, as
you go through the whole process. There are a number of clients who only really reveal the very
challenges that brought them to therapy maybe in the fifth session.”).

162
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order to see results.163 As such, the implementing partners have
prioritized long-term investment and quality services in those areas in
which they work, rather than providing brief services to a larger
region.164
Awareness of cultural attitudes: Interviewees described a variety of ways
in which underlying cultural attitudes were deeply problematic in
obtaining successful individual outcomes. For example, work with
former child soldiers required doing a significant amount of work to help
both former child soldiers and their families recognize that the child did
not want to be abducted and that their participation in the conflict was
not a conscious choice.165 In other examples, in order to successfully
provide a person with a prosthetic limb, the implementing partners first
had to address the stigma of disability. Physical rehabilitation required
significant pre-work to assuage the general fear of surgical operations.166
The implementing partners recognize the inescapable connection
between these attitudes and sustainable success for individual
beneficiaries, allowing them to design a holistic approach to the Ugandan
context.167

163

Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“People stayed in camps for over twenty years. In
fact, according to research, Northern Uganda lost a whole generation because of the war. A whole
generation was lost. So bringing that back takes a lot.”).

164

Interview with Participant D, supra note 108 (“Normally [when] you start again the dialogue, it's
like a swarm of bees, again you are provoked . . . And that's why normally it takes three even four
months. You do this; after, then you go again; like that, you go back. After the group, then you go
to the [other] extremes, to the individual—and that's actually the approach they use now, it's still
happening. And I would say it's working well now.”)
Equally complicated and much less spoken of is the evidence that some families ‘handed over’
their children to armed groups for a variety of reasons not all of which were coercion-based. See
Children as Soldiers, in THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 1996, UNICEF (1996)
http://perma.cc/V2ML-LBDN (“In Myanmar, parents volunteer their children for the rebel
Karen army because the guerrillas provide clothes and two square meals a day . . .” ); Esha
Chhabra, How Do Children End Up as Child Soldiers?, TAKE PART (Oct. 15, 2015)
http://perma.cc/L74X-N4S7 (“Parents see [their children becoming child soldiers] as a way to
make money too.”) (quoting Eric Stover, professor at the University of California, Berkeley); Use
of Child Soldiers ‘Particularly Abusive,’ UN Expert Testifies, UN NEWS (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://perma.cc/3HA2-STUN.
Interview with Participant Q, supra note 106 (“There are some of these persons who have fears.
And they'll look at their situation and they say ‘If I go and am operated, I may die.’ So my role is
to help this person understand and take a decision. Either to go or not. But in what—my aim is
this person needs to forget about the fear and get treatment.”).
Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“I'm not saying that [the stigma] totally is gone but
it's just at a lower scale now, due to the community dialogue, the sensitization—the interventions
that we have done in the communities to most of these LRA abductees … In case of any
circumstance, like I give an example where one, we lost three weeks ago, we lost one of our CBT
members that graduated. And all the CBT members within that subcounty came in to support in

165
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167
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Use of multi-level interventions: Relatedly, most implementing partners
reported that their work was effective in part because they were able to
work on multiple levels (for example, individual, family, community)
simultaneously.168 Community education on the experience of being a
former child soldier or mental illness was seen as critical to the wellbeing of individual beneficiaries. The implementing partners not only
prepared individual beneficiaries to return to community life but they
also prepared the community to receive the individual beneficiaries back.
Flexibility in program design: Many interviewees noted the importance
of flexibility in program design given the complex social dynamics
lingering in communities.169 For example, one implementing partner
offers the option of group or individual therapy sessions, which may be
particularly helpful when a beneficiary feels uncomfortable in a group
setting or when the person was a perpetrator of violence during the
conflict. Others have learned the importance of crafting groups to not
include relatives or allowing for modifications to the standardized CBT
protocol when necessary (for example, by eliminating the writing-based
elements of treatment).170 These and other changes have emerged from
the implementing partners’ years of experience doing this work; the
continued openness and willingness to adapt programming and learn
from past mistakes is a key strength.
Singular area of expertise versus holistic program offerings: There was
some difference in opinion among the interviewees regarding whether
the better program design was one that incorporated multiple services
(for example, physical and psychological services) or one that focused
solely on a single offering. In particular, CVT attributed its program
successes to its singular focus on psychotherapy, which allowed them to

the burial, buying coffin, giving food, they support until the burial. So in such a way of
togetherness there's this aspect of reduced stigma because you know at the end of the day ‘I'm not
alone.’”).
168

169

170

Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“[W]hat happens during follow-up, we interact again
with the family members and the community members where this person has been reintegrated.
We check the condition of the limb, if it needs some minor repair, on-spot repair we can do.”).
Interview with Participant Y, supra note 98 (“[W]e emphasize a lot, even if the person, even if you
are in a group you can be free to choose to also have at the same time individual session so that
you are able to handle what you are not able to handle in the group.”).
Interview with Participant W, supra note 154 (“Let me use this example of CBT—cognitive
behavioral approach. It has a recommended practice of, for example, a client having to write, keep
record of personal diary of symptoms, which you will see that can be really very helpful to a
number of clients. But then—especially when you work with individual clients—but then, either
this client doesn't know how to write or knows how to write but the culture of writing is not
his—writing is not a habit to him.”).
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develop an expertise and credibility while ensuring that only those
beneficiaries who truly wanted that particular kind of help participated in
their programs. By contrast, others thought the strength of their
programs was in their ability to offer cross-cutting services.171
Commitment to program evaluation and evolution: Implementing
partners all acknowledge the value of regular program evaluation and
devote staff time and resources to ensuring that regular program
evaluations take place.172 While all implementing partners make formal
reports to the Trust Fund at periodic intervals, interviewees also
described other ways in which they immediately applied their findings by
making changes to their programs.173 For example, feedback from
beneficiaries prompted TPO Uganda to change the locations of its
clinical outreach program after learning that beneficiaries were finding it
too difficult to routinely travel to the town of Gulu to receive
medication.
Focus on program sustainability: Interviewees are acutely aware that the
assistance mandate is a time-limited program and are thus invested in
building independent, sustainable programs.174 For some, this means
developing formal partnerships with the government, while for others it
means getting involved in advocacy and lobbying efforts to increase
funding for services in the region.175 Interviewees also noted an

171

Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“So I could say that this positive impact has come as a
result of TFV because it has a combination—the physical, the drug for mental, and CBT, the
livelihood.”); Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“[M]y major interest when I joined the
project I just got so much excited about it, integration. Because on several occasions I've been
with other organizations, you find that there's only CBT. But TFV has been integrating physical
rehabilitation, bringing the issue of medicine, and bringing the aspect of the psychological support
through CBT, that is a very good approach.”).

172

Interview with Participant H, supra note 97. (“You know with the information it can help us in a
lot of ways. You can change interventions in case I realize that what "I'm doing is not helping,
what should I do?" We have tools for assessing the quality of work.”).
Interview with Participant O, supra note 112 (“We do also consult people to give us feedback on
how our performance [sic] and we are very, very open. So that's why, in most cases we call
ourselves that we are a learning institution because the learning doesn't stop.”).

173

174

Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“And we are very encouraging the [group members]
to keep on visiting one another and we have instilled into them the sustainability. Whether we are
already done with the CBT, for them they should not stop. They should continue with it.”);
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“Because we are now buying everything, we are
supplying to the health centers, and the government is basically not doing anything. So that is not
sustainable because we might go away, we might not get donor opportunities anymore from TFV,
so what happens to all those people? So [we] have been working on a more sustainable way that
we want to start implementing [called] a drug bank.”).

175

Telephone Interview with Participant M, supra note 124 (“Okay, at least with GROW, there's the
workshop, there's a hospital. The government of Uganda might not really be totally supportive.
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additional, program sustainability-related benefit of working with local
staff and volunteers: some of those who have developed skills and
training through the assistance mandate plan to continue the work in
their communities when the Uganda assistance mandate closes.176

4. Partnerships with local officials and with other implementing
partners contribute to the outreach and the efficiency of the
assistance mandate.
As with the Trust Fund, the implementing partners approach their work
with a mindset of partnership and collaboration. One important collaboration is
with the Ugandan government officials in the region.177 In general, this involves
the implementing partners providing regular information to local officials about
the operations of the program and includes the local officials assisting with
mobilization and outreach. In addition to helping with outreach, this partnership
reduces the risk of government pushback or objection to the presence of the
implementing partners in the villages, which could be a significant obstacle to
effective programming.178 However, making the work in the community
dependent on political agreement comes with some obvious risks and
challenges, including the risks of political commodification and the challenge of
navigating between different political entities with highly divergent views.
Interviewees noted that this inclusive approach with local officials served
as a signal to the government that it should be responsible for providing these
services. The perception was that if the officials felt they played a role in the
assistance mandate program, they may be more willing to take ownership in the

176

177

178

But what we tried to do also through our assistance mandate is to build this type of link with the
government so that at a certain point, hopefully they can take over. Or support, if they cannot take
over, continue supporting.”); Interview with Participant O, supra note 112 (“But it's the same
group of people who needed compensation and reparation from government. It shouldn't be the
responsibility of the Trust Fund to begin to give material support, which is a government
responsibility.”).
Interview with Participant S, supra note 95 (“First of all, what I looked at as strength, the kind of
structures that GWED-G have. Because I am based in the community. And there's no way out.
I'm not going to be—I will remain there. I am a trained person now on counseling techniques,
how to link them to other facility, health facilities. So even if GWED-G is no longer there, we are
there in the community. We are there to support our people, even if the project is not there, we
are there.”).
Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“We don't just go and enter into the community. We
first go to the district leaders, we report our presence, like the district health officer, maybe the
political wing. Then we go to the subcounty, and then from the subcounty we go down to the
parishes and then the villages.”).
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“You have to be very careful that you're not stepping
on the toes of the government so it's very important to have good ties with them because no
matter what you want to do you always have to let them know.”).
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future—particularly once they saw how much constituents appreciated the
program. We agree that this is an effective strategy for maintaining long-term
programs and persuading local officials to take greater responsibility for their
constituents.
Another important partnership which contributes to the success of the
assistance mandate is the collaboration between the implementing partners
themselves. The partners work together in a variety of ways to provide services
as efficiently as possible. For example, when two implementing partners realized
they were operating in the same subcounty, they divided the territory between
themselves to avoid the duplication of services. Many partnerships are formed
between implementing partners that provide physical rehabilitation and those
that provide psychological rehabilitation. This collaborative approach extends to
the broader network of NGOs in the region, as beneficiaries who need services
not covered by the assistance mandate can be referred to the NGOs that do
provide those services. NGO coordination meetings and coalitions also helped
implementing partners share information and identify areas of growing needs
and future work.
Many interviewees described how their program evolved in response to
feedback from beneficiaries, volunteers, and other community leaders. Indeed,
the partnerships between the Trust Fund itself and the implementing partners is
an important source of mutual learning and development.179 The collaborative
conference hosted by the Trust Fund in Kampala to both share the revised
performance monitoring plan with the implementing partners and solicit their
feedback on how to more accurately evaluate the work of the assistance mandate
is just one example of this exchange.

5. Implementing partners promote staff well-being and invest in their
development to ensure long-term staff retention and productivity.
Implementing the assistance mandate is incredibly emotional and difficult
work which carries a high risk of burnout as well as the accompanying risk of a
high turnover rate and substandard work.180 This risk is particularly heightened
179

180

Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“Some of the questions [asked by beneficiaries] that
we feel we do not have the answer to—we imagine that someone maybe down there would help
us, so we throw it back. Then maybe someone can help us, we are not just here to answer because
we are not teaching, we are not teaching here, we are just trying to converse and see how we can
make our community a better community to live in. No, not teaching. Not teaching. They end up
teaching us.”); see, for example, Béatrice Pouligny, Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:
Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building ‘New’ Societies, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE 495
(2005) (discussing the challenge of working in post-conflict sites).
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“We cannot help everyone. And, of course, that's
something that, for social workers, is very difficult. We come [sic] there and we have to decline
people who really need our help.”).
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when the staff members have lived through the conflict themselves and are
contending with their own trauma and post-conflict readjustment as they work
to support others. Given the importance of trust and relationship-building in
carrying out the assistance mandate, having consistent, long-term staff members
is very important to the success of the program. As such, one important
organizational strength among implementing partners is the genuine desire to
support their staff.181 The implementing partners have worked to develop
cultures of self-care, mutual support, and clinical supervision to promote staff
well-being.182 Relatedly, there is an ongoing investment in training and skillsbuilding that prevents burnout by ensuring staff are equipped to perform the
difficult work with which they are tasked.

V. K EY C HALLEN GES F ACING THE A SSISTANCE M ANDATE
Over the course of the interviews and field observations, several key
challenges facing the assistance mandate in Northern Uganda emerged. As with
the strengths, the challenges facing the Trust Fund and the implementing
partners are distinct but related. Many of these challenges are simply realities that
neither the Trust Fund nor the implementing partners can resolve. As such, the
following challenges are not presented as a list of suggested changes but rather
as a reflection of the current situation on the ground facing those who
implement the assistance mandate.

A. Challenges Facing the Trust Fund
1. The Trust Fund’s relationship with the ICC creates both legal and
political obstacles to the Trust Fund’s work.
While the Trust Fund’s position within the ICC has obvious and significant
value, implementing rehabilitative programs within the strictures of a system that
at its core is a criminal legal system is a challenge. On a procedural level, the ICC
processes that govern Trust Fund operations (for example, the selection of
implementing partners) were originally designed for a very different context than
the world occupied by the Trust Fund.183 For example, the Procurement Review
181

Interview with Participant Z, supra note 131 (“I realized that one of the conditions to empower an
organization to provide services is they need to have paid staff. And staff who are not in
condition of starving or maybe underfed or more vulnerable than the client themselves.”).

182

Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“When you experience something very traumatic in
your work, you have somewhere to vent, always have meetings with clinical psychologist, every
Monday, where you can share with her and help you process. You can come across a serious case
and you come back home and you have nightmares. Someone can [tell] you something so, so
traumatizing.”).
Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, supra note 16.

183
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Committee (PRC) of the ICC must give the final approval for the award of
grants to the chosen implementing partners.184 However, the PRC is staffed by
ICC employees who often have no experience with rehabilitative program
design.185 Thus, the Trust Fund finds itself in the position of having to work
within a system not designed for the kind of programs it supports. The Trust
Fund must navigate both the ICC and the reality on the ground to deliver the
assistance mandate, but the fit is not always perfect.186 Some interviewees
indicated that, given the small size of the Trust Fund in comparison to the ICC,
there is a lack of understanding of its role among Court personnel. As such,
Trust Fund staff must not only carry out their own work but must also translate
it and advocate for its role within the ICC. This translation work can be
demanding and take away much needed personnel and administrative capacity
from the day-to-day work of the Trust Fund.
The relationship with the ICC has the potential to present another kind of
challenge on the ground, depending on the local perception of the Court’s
activities.187 In Northern Uganda, the Court initially had a mixed reception due
to prosecutorial strategy and the methodology being used in the field by criminal
investigators and prosecutors which complicated the Trust Fund’s early work.188
Though not necessarily the case in Uganda, the relationship with the Court may
also limit which nonprofit organizations are able and willing to contract with the
Trust Fund due to the often-politicized nature of ICC involvement in a
particular jurisdiction. Though the relationship with the ICC can present a
challenge to the Trust Fund, many interviewees described how the Trust Fund’s
work in the region helped improve the perception of the ICC over time.189 In the
184

185

Administrative Instruction, International Criminal Court, Composition and Terms of Reference
for the Procurement Review Committee, ¶ 3.2, ICC/AI/2004/004 (2004).
Interview with Participant M, supra note 121 (“And on top of that you go and defend [to the
PRC] and people don't understand [sic] they say ‘Why did you need three years to provide
psychological rehabilitation, can’t you do just six months?’”).

186

Id. (“It’s a bit of applying knowledge that you get from both sides to make things happen because
it is—there’s a reality of the Trust Fund, one foot is in the field, the other is in the ICC.”).

187

Id. (“What is difficult is, I mean it's always the same thing I've noticed in Congo, what is difficult
is you never know the level of information that people have. And so even if you stress that you
are part of the ICC but you are not doing the, you are not here to interview for the case—that can
be difficult. And maybe people they have already preconceived ideas, sometimes it's difficult to
convey the message.”).
Interview with Participant N, supra note 122.

188
189

Interview with Participant C, supra note 130 (“[T]hat's another aspect of what the assistance
mandate can do, is it can, in some ways, inoculate issues of jealousy or misunderstanding as to
‘why them, why this side,’ you know, particularly when you're talking about conflicts that involve
different ethnic groups where the charges against one side occur years before the charges against
the other side . . . that is where I think there's a real value [in the assistance mandate] to the Court
just—not just the TFV, but the Court itself. Because we are a criminal court, I think it's valuable
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authors’ view, it is not clear that the ICC fully appreciates the extent and scope
of the Trust Fund’s contribution to its success and its acceptance.

2. The Trust Fund has limited resources and capacity but is
expanding its operations in other regions.
The expansion of the Trust Fund’s work presents a pragmatic challenge for
the organization. The Trust Fund is in the process of opening a new assistance
mandate in the Cote d’Ivoire while continuing its work in both Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.190 Simultaneously, it is considering
reinstating the Central African Republic program, which was suspended for
security concerns in 2013, and expanding to Mali.191 The ICC has started to
reach the reparations stage of its cases and has now issued reparations orders in
three cases—activating the Trust Fund’s responsibilities under its reparations
mandate for the first time.192 Though the Trust Fund is a part of the ICC, it does
not receive any funding from the Court to carry out its work and must raise
funds from donor governments.193 Despite its limited resources, the Trust Fund
has accomplished a great deal to date, evidenced by the success of the assistance
mandate in Northern Uganda. However, the increasing demands placed on the
Trust Fund present a significant challenge for future work, and require greater
attention by states and by the ICC Chambers as they oversee the Trust Fund’s
implementation processes.

to the prosecutor that the assistance mandate exists because I would hope that it would alleviate
some of the political pressures.”); Interview with Participant U, supra note 87 (“It has been very
clear. And, of course also the authenticity of what we do, yeah, it is also giving a credit to the ICC
itself. Because you don't see ICC as a prosecutor and purely coming to prosecute.”).
190

191

192
193

Press Release, International Criminal Court, Trust Fund for Victims Decides to Launch
Assistance Programme in Côte d’Ivoire, U.N. Press Release ICC-TFV-20170517-PR1304 (May
17, 2017), http://perma.cc/9RGJ-9CAU (stating that the ICC will launch a new assistance
program in Côte d’Ivoire “to provide physical, psychological rehabilitation and material support
for the benefit of victims of crimes.”).
Press Release, Following Mr. Bemba’s Acquittal, supra note 59; Statement by Trust Fund for
Victims Board of Directors: Under the Rome Statute, Reparative Justice Provides Undeniable
Value to Victims, International Criminal Court (Sept. 14, 2018), http:/perma.cc/NUV7-3Y3Y.
Reparations Orders, THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, http://perma.cc/S72K-6HGN.
Frédéric Mégret, Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court’s Victims Trust Fund: Lessons
from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 123, 125–26 (2010) (noting that the TFV
receives “voluntary contributions from governments, international organizations, individuals, and
corporations,”which are stored in a separate account from that of the Court directed reparations
and which may be “awarded at the Fund’s discretion.”).
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B. Challenges Facing the Implementing Partners
1. There is an overwhelming need for the finite services of the
implementing partners as well as a growing problem of hunger.
The primary challenge noted by interviewees was the significant need for
the services offered by the implementing partners. Even a decade after the
conclusion of the active fighting, war-related trauma remains a serious issue with
very few treatment options available in the region. Indeed, the assistance
mandate is one of the very few sources of funding purely dedicated to
rehabilitating the lingering war trauma—and as the providers of this kind of
care, the implementing partners’ staff are acutely aware of the extent of the need
that they are unable to meet.194 This issue underscores the obvious point that
harm and trauma occasioned by serious violations of international law may
require sustained, long-term, and perhaps lifelong interventions. This situation
requires a different approach to the scale and scope of the costs and
commitments of rehabilitation.
This need becomes more evident as the implementing partners become
more effective at mobilization and outreach. Many interviewees noted that the
implementing partners are reaching the point where their outreach has
encouraged more potential beneficiaries to come forward than they have the
capacity to serve.195 This dynamic is particularly pronounced at the end of a grant
cycle, after the outreach and community education has had time to reach its full
impact. In addition to the obvious hardship of people not having access to
needed services, there is also an emotional toll on the staff who witness the
scope of the suffering and who must turn away people who are seeking their
services due to lack of capacity. Aware that the assistance mandate cannot alone
address all of the remaining needs in the region, most implementing partners
focus their work on specific villages or areas that suffered the most during the
194

195

Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“[W]e try to deal with it by referring it to other
programs—of course we're very much aware of what the programs are on the ground but those
other programs are either government programs or NGOs who are not so specialized in mental
health. There are not many who are so specialized in mental health.”); Interview with Participant
H, supra note 97 (“[W]e support victims for physical rehabilitation but now you find that within
the communities, Lakwana, according to the budget supports only six people. But it is having a
list of people. Awach is supposed to bring seven. The person, the social worker, have a list of
people who have identified with this complication with around ninety-eight people. But out of
only that, seven people.”).
Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“And then another challenge is that due to our wide
sensitization of the TPO activities, the people who comes [sic] for a drug during the clinic
outreach, it is now too many. We started with about forty. But now, as we talk, in Lakwana last
month it was 190—”); Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“196. It was so
overwhelming.”).
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conflict while simultaneously encouraging greater government investment in
rehabilitation programs. However, the need for services is so great that some
interviewees reported people moved into regions covered by the implementing
partners just to receive services.
In addition to the need for physical and psychological rehabilitation
services, the general poverty of the region adds another dimension of
challenge.196 In particular, hunger is increasing across the region as climate
change reduces crop yield to dangerously low levels.197 This hunger interferes
with both physical healing and psychological interventions, diminishing the
effectiveness of the assistance mandate programming.198 The implementing
partners have adopted various strategies to mitigate the impact of hunger,
including scheduling program activities at a time when people are more likely to
have eaten some food, but it remains a significant challenge.

2. Grant restrictions prevent implementing partners from reaching
many people who need their services.
The strict eligibility date for the assistance mandate—requiring that the
harm occurred after July 1, 2002—was identified as a significant challenge by
virtually all interviewees.199 This matter of timelines poses a broader challenge
for the international criminal justice and transitional justice fields.200 The terms
196

Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“And then another challenge is that when I talk about
the physical rehabilitation it is only catering for treatment and drugs. That is surgery, and then
drugs after the surgery. But the review is not included. So sometimes you find that the surgery is
done, the drug is given and the doctor is telling the patient to come after two weeks. And the
budget for that patient is now not there. So you find that the transport cost and other things for
review is not there. And you find at the end of the day, some of the patient who cannot afford
coming to the doctor again, they remain with that surgery and the drug given. No coming for a
review.”).

197

Interview with Participants E, I, & T, in Awach Subcounty, Uganda (July 12, 2017) (notes on file
with authors); See Joseph Kamara & Andre Renzaho, The Politics of Food and the Fight Against
Hunger: Reflections and Lessons from Uganda, 14 AFR. J. FOOD, AGRIC., NUTRITION & DEV. 9016
(2014); Uganda: Hunger Stalks North East, 50 AFR. RES. BULL. 20018 (2013).

198

Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“For example, now, one of the big challenges that
we're also seeing is that there's a lot of famine. It's very difficult. Because I mean you go and do
your counseling session when people haven't eaten and their mind is somewhere else because the
children are at home crying. What are you going to reach with your—and what is the solution?
Are you providing food? But that takes away the strength of the counseling.”).
Interview with Participant E, supra note 83 (“You know, the war started in about 1989. And, the
effect started coming from that age, from that year. And when we look at the Rome Statute, 2002,
it means we are leaving many behind. And others they have a serious condition, which you see
and you really sympathize but they are not the conditions of the project.”).
Valérie Rosoux, Time and Reconciliation: Negotiating with Ghosts, in TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN
TRANSITIONAL AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES, 17–34 (Natascha Mueller-Hirth & Sandra Rios
Oyola eds., 2018) (discussing time in post-conflict negotiations and reconciliation, the “ripeness”

199
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of reference for many criminal and reparative processes are often arbitrary, may
not correspond to the totality of the harms experienced, and will often leave out
victims groups whose sole basis for exclusion from remedy is that they fall on
the wrong side of an arbitrary date. It is very difficult for staff to implement this
provision, given the significant need of those who were harmed prior to 2002
and the dearth of other options available in the region.201 The implementing
partners have gone to great lengths to ensure that this seemingly arbitrary divide
in eligibility does not create tensions within the community.202 Their primary
strategy is clearly and consistently announcing the time requirement and
managing expectations in its initial contacts with a community. However, the
cutoff remains a challenge.203
Another challenge arising from the limitations of the assistance mandate is
the end of the material assistance funding. The Trust Fund recently phased out
material assistance in light of the difficulty of proving that the primarily
economic harms being remedied were traceable to the conflict after so many
of a conflict, and the non-linearity of reconciliation shaped by a plurality of interests and multiple
time frames); see also Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice Time: Uncle San, Aunty Yan, and
Outreach at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, in id. (arguing that transitional justice time is premised on a
teleological transformation and liberal democratic outcome that erases historical complexities and
effaces local understandings); Sandra Rios Oyola, Peace Processes and Social Acceleration: The Case of
Colombia, in id. (arguing that social and political peace processes operate on two different timelines
and that the latter tries to accelerate the former).
201

Interview with Participant P, supra note 118 (“You know there's always that tendency, that
temptation; for example, you are based in that same location and you are working with the people
you know. So there's that temptation of kind of leaning, eh? You say oh, all right,’ You're in your
own subcounty.’ Because at that time of recruitment, we emphasize the fact that the facilitator
must come from that particular subcounty. So dealing with people you know, it's not easy. They
also face that challenge.”).

202

Id. (“When you go to a community of mobilized war victims, there are so many. There are even
those who suffered atrocities before 2002 and they also have the—they are critical, their cases are
critical in nature . . . We are facing it, it is not easy but we constantly keep telling people that every
project has a timeframe and limitation. Then secondly we keep also bringing in the aspect that the
government is responsible to provide services for war victims, that we are only complementing
what they do.”); Interview with Participant S, supra note 95 (“This is why we have actually come
out with the sensitization. Because the issue of sensitization addressed the problem of maybe
creating differences [based on the 2002 eligibility criteria]. That: ‘These people are benefitting,
how about us who are not benefitting?’ So it is really very important to sensitize them to let them
know how the project is being implemented.”).

203

Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“It's really tough. I mean the [social workers] have a
big heart for these communities, they work with them every day, they drive 40 minutes every day
to go over bad roads to meet these people. And to some they have to say ‘no.’ ‘No, you are not
getting medication; no, you are not getting physical treatment; no, you are not getting
psychological treatment.’ It's really tough.”); Interview with Participant U, supra note 87 (“I
remember one of the clients asked: ‘Do you mean that you people are coming strictly for people
who have suffered from 2002? Are they different from us? Are they a different tribe?’ That was a
question. So that becomes a very challenging aspect.”).
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years. However, most implementing partners view the return to economic
productivity as an integral part of rehabilitation. Contributing to the community
through work is seen as an important way to sustain the improvements made
during treatment as beneficiaries regain a sense of dignity and purpose.
Additionally, as the material assistance benefit was usually distributed to groups
after they completed CBT, much of its perceived value was in maintaining the
group structure and cohesion beyond the weeks of therapy. Interviewees
described how when groups had a reason to continue meeting after the
conclusion of therapy, the group members would engage in informal mutual
support of each other.204 As such, the end of material assistance is seen as a
challenge to the sustainability of the psychological and physical rehabilitation
efforts.205
A final challenge with the assistance mandate grants themselves is the
duration of the granting period. It is difficult to see the positive impact of the
assistance mandate work in a single year, given both the pace of the work and
the importance of building relationships and trust with the community prior to
delivering services.206 Interviewees also noted that the inherent uncertainty of the
grant funding sometimes presented difficulties in retaining staff and providing
uninterrupted services as the end of the grant cycle approached. In recognition
of these challenges, the Trust Fund in 2015 lengthened its grant cycle from an
annual process to a three-year term; the 2018 RFP tender will enact a 5-year
grant cycle. This change is widely seen as providing a more realistic timeframe
given the scale of the assistance mandate, but grants of even longer duration
would be welcomed, a change the Trust Fund is currently considering.

204

205

206

Interview with Participant F, supra note 83 (“I think TFV stopped last winter [the material
support] . . . But what we've seen on the ground, that livelihood support helps in keeping the
cohesion. So that people continue having that extra support . . . After meeting them, there's
nothing that brings them together. Everyone will go their own way and they'll start having the
same problems. But the ones who are keeping together [for material support], they're healing, the
relapses are not there.”).
Interview with Participant I, supra note 90 (“[I]t's actually a sustainable approach for counseling as
well. They've met each other through counseling, they know how to talk to each other because
they've learned that. And because they still need to meet each other for this VSLA or this pig
project or whatever, they keep an eye on each other. And actually I think, I would love to do
research on it, but I think the relapse rate is much lower.”).
Interview with Participant H, supra note 97 (“When you want to assess impact, impact evaluation,
it is a long period of time. It is not like ‘I finished the CBT today, after two month I am going to
assess impact.’ That is not right. I have to assess impact after some period, maybe 2 years, 3 years,
4 years.”).
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3. Many services require ongoing treatment but cannot be provided
after the assistance mandate ends.
While all interviewees were acutely aware of the importance of building
sustainable programs, many of the services currently provided would not be able
to continue without the assistance mandate. This was a key area of concern for
interviewees and was especially problematic for those working with
interventions that inherently require ongoing adjustment and adaptation (such as
the provision of prosthetic limbs). For these services to retain their efficacy into
the future, there must be the capacity for long-term service provision.207 Though
implementing partners have made efforts to encourage government ownership
and investment in physical and psychological rehabilitation, the government is
still not ready to manage the program.208 Developing the sustainability of the
program remains a key challenge for the implementing partners, particularly
given the understanding that the assistance mandate funding will not exist in
perpetuity. This is a challenge beyond the day-to-day capacity of the Trust Fund
and requires sustained political commitment by donor governments and a clear
political internalization of the value added from the Trust Fund’s work.209

4. Reliance on government partnerships compromises the work and
the objectives of the implementing partners.
Though government partnerships are an important source of collaboration
for implementing partners, the relationships are not without their challenges.
Relying on government actors for help with the mobilization and outreach work
leaves the implementing partners with less control over the process. Though
many local officials are eager to help with the assistance mandate and do much
to move the projects forward, others fail to uphold their outreach commitments,
causing the implementing partners to delay planned work. In response to these
207

Interview with Participant J, supra note 89 (“[T]he challenge, it would be on after the end of the
project. That's when the challenge would be. For the clients who are now walking on their
prosthetic, time will come, they will go back to crutches.”).

208

Interview with Participant K, supra note 82 (“But also at a higher level, AVSI headquarters at the
higher level, with the Ministry of Health, they're trying to have some meetings on sustainability.
Sustainability. It is only Trust Fund. ‘Government, what is your contribution? What is the
contribution?’ But I wouldn't say that we are optimistic.”); Interview with Participant D, supra
note 108 (“Then I would say another challenge is really sustainability and networking with the
government projects. The government projects tend to come in a crisis and are not well-planned .
. . Like we are doing an agriculture component which covers all of this. The government also
comes with Operation Wealth Creation, but the way they're doing it is not correct. They come
with seeds, but the mindset, identification, training, it's not there.”).
Interview with Participant Z, supra note 131 (“What other challenges? Another challenge that I
see in terms of sustainability is the fact that even the government has no plan, no attention or
consideration for psychological counseling services.”).
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challenges, implementing partners have developed a variety of strategies,
including (diplomatically) increasing their oversight of the elected officials
conducting outreach work.
As noted above, one growing concern about government partnerships is
the politicization of the assistance mandate.210 Implementing partners have
observed that the political affiliation of the elected official sometimes influenced
which individuals were connected with the implementing partners. This has
prompted some implementing partners to broaden their outreach partnerships
to include less-political entities (for example, village health teams). In other
cases, government leaders attempted to use their position of power to exploit
the system. For example, interviewees described officials attempting to get
services for their relatives who did not meet the assistance mandate eligibility
criteria. Broader issues of corruption and inefficiency are a particular challenge
for those implementing partners that have formal partnerships with the
government for service provision.

5. Pragmatic challenges such as long travel time increase the risk of
burnout and hinder access to rural communities.
Many of the challenges identified by interviewees were the simple but
serious difficulties of traveling to the beneficiaries. One of the most common
issues interviewees identified is that people with the greatest need for services
often live in deeply rural areas. The travel time to reach these places requires
staff to work extremely long days, increasing risk of burnout—or is simply
impractical. The poor infrastructure in much of the northern region further
complicates travel plans because the mud roads are impassable when it rains.
This is particularly problematic when implementing partners need to rely on
hired cars for transport, as drivers are unwilling to put much strain on their
vehicles. In addition to the scheduling complications, interviewees linked the
pragmatic challenges of access to the importance of building trust with
communities: cancelling plans at the last minute weakens credibility and the
perception of the organization as a nonprofit that keeps its word.

6. Continued tensions in the community slows the progress of the
work of the assistance mandate.
As a final challenge, interviewees described how their work to address
historical harms is complicated by ongoing tensions within communities.211 Most
210
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Interview with Participant K, supra note 82; Interview with Participant D, supra note 108.
Ongoing political instability continues to characterize political life in Uganda, with a lack of
accountable democracy and profound rule of law deficits. See Freedom in the World 2018: Uganda,
FREEDOM HOUSE, http://perma.cc/9HM9-2G8W.
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significantly, this includes the ongoing problem of stigmatization.212 While
interviewees have seen some improvement, reducing stigma requires lengthy,
sustained engagement on multiple levels. As such, many of the beneficiaries who
come forward to receive services still face harassment and stigmatization for
doing so.
In addition to stigma, other sources of community tension complicate the
work of the assistance mandate. Land conflicts were the predominant issue that
often encroached on discussions in group sessions, but interviewees mentioned
that domestic violence and substance abuse—which are often viewed as
resulting from unresolved trauma—were also prevalent.213 Though the
resolution of land conflicts is outside the scope of the assistance mandate, such
issues could not be ignored in the group therapy sessions given their effect on
group dynamics. While implementing partners referred such issues to other
community leaders for resolution, these issues and other disruptions in the social
fabric remain after the war, complicating the work of the assistance mandate.

VI. C ONCLUSION
This study presents a unique snapshot of the work of the Trust Fund for
Victims, a unique and understudied international organization. The ICC
constitutes an experiment in delivering international justice to the world’s most
marginalized and vulnerable populations. Only countries that are “unwilling or
unable” to deliver justice find themselves subject to the ICC’s oversight.214 Each
institutional entity within the ICC’s institutional framework is an essential
partner in that endeavor. For better or worse, the Trust Fund’s work has
received less attention and assessment than other parts of the architecture. This
analysis fills that gap.
This analysis offers a set of grounded insights, based on direct fieldwork
with the Trust Fund’s partners, pointing to the value and necessity of the
assistance mandate. It reveals new ways to understand “repair and remedy” in
local contexts, where resources are limited and justice is delayed or partial. It
draws attention to the intrinsic value of engaging communities that have
experienced sustained and horrific human rights violations when criminal legal
process is triggered by the ICC’s engagement. By preparing those communities
well, building capacity, resilience and engagement with those individuals who are
212

See, for example, Sarah Kihika Kasande, In Uganda, Confronting Stigma is Key to Preventing Impunity for
Sexual Violence in Conflict, ICTJ (Sept. 18, 2017), http://perma.cc/5BUJ-E6BS.
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Most of the land conflicts involved boundary disputes among returnees. These disputes are
difficult to resolve given that many of the landowners were killed during the conflict and the
disputes are among descendants.
How the Court Works, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://perma.cc/MCB9-T9XJ.
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the witnesses and victims enabling the work of the Court, the enterprise of
international criminal justice is likely to be more successful in practice. To date,
much of the work on the interface between criminal justice processes and
reparations has taken a distinctly linear view of the relationship between them,
generally that criminal justice comes first and reparation follows sequentially.
What this assumption misses are the limitations that exist for individuals and
communities to “do” criminal justice well, when the consequences of human
rights and humanitarian law violations are severe and persistent. In our analysis,
the assistance mandate is a vital intermediate engagement with the victims of
systematic human rights violations, preparing them to better engage with the
demands of international criminal justice—in addition to the benefits of
beginning the healing process earlier. What this means in practice is that the
earlier the intervention which engages directly with trauma and the direct
physical and psychological legacies of violence for victims will be more likely to
ensure that victims can move forward positively with their lives. Moreover, the
research results suggest that this intermediate engagement means victims will be
better placed physically, psychologically and communally to receive reparations
(should they follow from perpetrator convictions). This step-by-step and holistic
approach to international criminal justice has a better chance in our view of
delivering justice in a way that is meaningful to affected communities and
individuals. Our analysis enables us to better appreciate the value of
interdisciplinary engagement in post-conflict sites and the intrinsic necessity of
knitting together economic, social, psycho-social, and legal responses to extreme
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. While the work of the Trust
Fund has obvious limitations (also evidenced by this study), it provides
innovation, attention to locality and privilege, and offers knowledge-sharing in a
fair and transparent way. Such models are a rarity in international law practice,
and deserve greater attention and acknowledgement when they do their work
well.
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